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Abstract 
This thesis explores how broadly naturalism can and should be construed. Orthodox 
naturalism assimilates the world of nature to the world as unveiled by the natural 
sciences. However, an exclusively scientistic conception of nature appears to exclude 
the ordinary, pre-philosophical understanding many facets of human life: minds, 
agency, mathematics, language, morals and normative phenomena more generally. It is 
clear, however, that any project that intends to expand the scope of the natural 
beyond that which is explicable through the natural sciences must still impose some 
limits if it is to retain the title of “naturalism”. Without such limits, there would be no 
reason to exclude paradigmatically non-natural entities, phenomena and 
explanations—gods, ghosts, magic, etc.—from our understanding of the world. 
This thesis rejects the narrow construal of nature offered by orthodox naturalism, 
and—without limitation to any single area of philosophy in which naturalism is a salient 
issue—explores the basis on which broader limits might be drawn. It addresses the 
question of why a more liberal naturalism, one that rejects the primacy of the natural 
sciences in distinguishing the natural, should still merit the label “naturalism”. 
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Chapter 1 – The Clash of Images 
Naturalism is at the forefront of many of the problems that contemporary 
philosophers concern themselves with. Where it is not at the forefront, it 
often lurks in the background.  
 
At its most basic level, naturalism is the view that the natural world is all 
there is. In this thesis, I take it for granted that some form of naturalism is 
true. Any true account of the world and the things that make it up, including 
human beings, must be naturalistic in some sense. We must be able to see 
any property or thing that exists as part of the natural world. However, 
taking some form of naturalism for granted leaves open many questions 
about its precise content. Barry Stroud has compared naturalism to the idea 
of world peace—“Almost everyone swears allegiance to it, and is willing to 
march under its banner… But disputes can still break out about what it is 
appropriate or acceptable to do in the name of the slogan.”1 
 
The disagreements about what things are, as Stroud puts it, acceptable to do 
in the name of naturalism fall along different axes. First, there is the 
question of just how restricted the world of natural facts should be—should 
it be limited to a small sub-set of the facts discovered by the natural 
sciences, such as physics, physiology and chemistry. Or should it also 
embrace a wider set of facts which, although not supplied by the natural 
sciences, should not be considered to be mysterious or spooky.  
 
A second question (or set of questions), once the line has been drawn, is to 
determine just which things that are commonly believed to be the case can 
be considered to be naturalistic, and what are the consequences for the 
things that cannot be considered naturalistic. This typically results in a 
programmatic attitude. Contemporary naturalists often see the task of 
philosophy as one of ‘naturalising’ theories or phenomena that do not 
appear to be in an appropriate shape to be given a rigorous scientific 
                                                          
1 (Stroud, 2004, p. 22) 
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treatment. They see their job as domesticating recalcitrant common-sense 
or philosophical errors to the natural world.   
 
The predominant form of naturalism in modern philosophy takes the 
natural world to be defined by the natural sciences. I will call this view 
scientific-naturalism and its adherents scientific-naturalists.  
 
Scientific-naturalists hold that the natural sciences have a monopoly on 
accurate descriptions of reality. Different scientific-naturalists may be more 
or less restrictive in the conceptual resources they license. At its most 
extreme, Scientific-Naturalism holds that anything that is true can be stated 
in the vocabulary of fundamental physics. A milder form, more sceptical 
about ability of physics to describe all of nature, may admit concepts used in 
other sciences such as chemistry and biology. However, all agree that any 
concepts that fall outside the exclusive set of concepts characteristic of the 
natural sciences, or a preferred subset of the natural sciences, cannot be 
part of a genuinely true description of the world.  
 
Perhaps the clearest statement of it comes from Sellars: 
 
“In the dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is 
the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it 
is not.”2 
 
Indeed, while Sellars might be thought of as an enemy of scientific-
naturalism in its more reductive guises on account of his insistence on the 
irreducibility of the normative to the non-normative, it is clear from the 
passage above that he accepts the ontology of the natural sciences. 
 
                                                          
2 (Sellars W. , Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, 1997) section 42 
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Some writers on this subject distinguish between methodological 
naturalism and ontological naturalism.3 Ontological naturalism is concerned 
with the types of facts and entities that are admissible. According to a 
scientific worldview, quarks, neutrons and neurons and the facts involving 
them will pass muster according to a scientific ontological naturalism, 
whereas those involving ghouls, ghosts and witches will not.  
 
Methodological naturalism on the other hand is concerned with the way in 
which investigations are made. For the scientific naturalist, it will be the 
scientific method that will yield naturalistically respectable philosophical 
theories, whereas theories yielded by other tools of the trade—say 
conceptual analysis, thought experiments, or intuitions—may require 
additional scrutiny to render them naturalistically respectable. Such a view 
may be thought by scientific naturalists to have the distinct advantage that 
although the ontology yielded by future science is uncertain, the scientific 
method will surely have roughly the same shape. Though different tools may 
exist—bigger particle accelerators, say—the fundamental techniques of 
observation, hypothesisation, experimentation, prediction and theory 
development will remain the same. 
 
For my purposes, however, the distinction between ontological and 
methodological naturalism will not be relevant, and I will slip freely 
between the two. I am concerned with the role that privileging the scientific 
worldview plays in generating familiar philosophical difficulties. Whether 
the privileging of science takes an ontological or a methodological shape is 
neither here nor there. 
 
The difficulties I have in mind begin when philosophers of a naturalistic 
bent try to align philosophy more closely with the natural sciences. The 
problems associated with naturalism manifest themselves where there is a 
tension between our ordinary, common-sense understanding of a 
                                                          
3 See, for example, the introduction to (De Caro & Macarthur, Naturalism and Normativity, 
2010, p. 4) 
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phenomena on the one hand, and the understanding of the same phenomena 
provided by the natural sciences.  
 
These tensions were expressed by Sellars as giving rise to a “clash” between 
the “’manifest’ image of man-in-the-world” and the “scientific image”.4 The 
former image has persons as a central ontological category, while the latter 
adopts the ontology of the natural sciences. As Sellars’ characterisation of 
the manifest view suggests, it is when persons are considered that the clash 
begins to make itself evident. Many of the difficulties in contemporary 
philosophy are generated when we try to bring the framework that has 
persons at its centre under the auspices of the scientific framework. 
According the latter, persons are not unities that constitute basic ontological 
categories, but are decomposable without loss into more fundamental 
elements of the ontology of the natural sciences. 
 
Sometimes, however, the clash extends further than persons and their 
properties. Ryle, for example, notes— 
 
“When we are in a certain intellectual mood, we seem to find clashes 
between the things scientists tell us about our furniture, clothes and 
limbs, and the things that we tell about them.”5 
 
I suspect that Sellars is still onto something when he puts human beings at 
the heart of the issue. As the Ryle quote suggests, the ways in which we 
speak about everyday objects that cannot be reconciled with the scientific 
viewpoint are our ways of speaking about them. To capture the generality of 
the clash, however, I will refer to the scientific view, and simply the manifest 
or common-sense view. 
Five Ms 
                                                          
4 (Sellars W. , Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1963, p. 6) 
5 (Ryle, 2015, p. 58) 
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Notable areas where these difficulties arise are the so called four Ms—
meaning, morality, mathematics and modality. In each area, there exist 
common-sense facts or objects posited which are not obviously subject to 
scientific investigation. The question thus arises for the scientific-naturalist, 
how are such facts to be placed in the natural world (that is, a world defined 
by the natural sciences)?   
 
Perhaps the most central folk belief about language is that words and 
sentences have meanings. There are, as it were, meaning facts—for example, 
“Grass is green” means that grass is green, or “Le chat est grand” means that 
the cat is big. Such facts, however, do not lend themselves to scientific 
investigation. One can certainly investigate language users, but meaning 
itself cannot be observed.  
 
In the case of mathematics, there is a commitment to abstract entities such 
as numbers, functions and sets that exist outside space and time, and 
therefore appear recalcitrant to scientific investigation. Even in cases where 
the sciences posit objects on a theoretical basis, as Rutherford did with the 
neutron and Higgs did with the particle that bears his name, they are in 
principle able to investigate the world to discover whether or not the 
objects that they posit exist.  
 
In the case of the Higgs boson and the neutron, such investigations yielded 
positive results. However, the negative case is also possible. The supposition 
of early-modern chemists that combustible materials contained a substance 
called phlogiston that was released during combustion was challenged by 
observational means. Some materials were observed to gain mass when 
burnt rather than losing mass as a result of departing phlogiston, and 
phlogiston was abandoned as a posit. It is difficult to see how such 
investigations might take place in the case of abstract entities such as 
numbers and sets. As non-spatiotemporal abstract objects, there is ex 
hypothesi nowhere to investigate. 
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There are also questions about the scientific respectability of mathematical 
facts of the form 12+54=66. One could not, for example, show the statement 
to be false by counting out twelve blocks, separately counting out 54 blocks, 
and then combining the two sets of blocks and counting the resultant single 
set. Any procedure that did not result in the answer 66 would serve only to 
show that one had gone wrong in the counting, not that the statement is 
false. As a general rule, mathematical statements such as these cannot be 
subject to empirical investigation or revision. This calls their scientific 
respectability into question. 
One might embark upon a mathematical proof to vindicate them, but the fact 
that one step in a proof follows from another is again not a matter for 
empirical investigation. 
 
Modal facts present similar difficulties. Paradigmatically, the truth of modal 
claims comes with a commitment to the existence of possible worlds. 
However, such possible worlds are causally isolated from the actual world, 
and are therefore not subject to scientific investigation. More fundamentally 
than this, the ambit of science appears to be restricted to how things are in 
the actual world.6 It does not concern itself with metaphysical necessity and 
possibility. Statements such as “Unicorns are possible” and “Bachelors are 
necessarily unmarried men” are not questions that the natural sciences will 
yield a verdict on. The status of modal facts in a world delineated by the 
natural sciences is therefore in doubt. 
 
Finally, there are difficulties in reconciling with moral facts with the natural 
sciences. As indicated in relation to modal facts, the natural sciences are 
concerned with how the world is. Moral facts, however, like modal facts, are 
not simply concerned with how the world is, they are concerned with what 
ought to be the case, and whether what is actually the case is good, bad or 
neither. The natural sciences are silent on such issues. Perhaps there is a 
                                                          
6 This point is more fundamental insofar as it does not depend on a particular view about the 
content of modal claims. For example, one that parses them in terms of possible worlds. 
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question of what constitutes good or bad science that is internal to the 
sciences, but this has nothing to do what is morally good. 
 
One might also add a fifth M—the mental. Intentionality is notoriously 
difficult to reconcile with the natural sciences. One reason is that intentional 
states are states that such and such—the belief that David Cameron was the 
Prime Minister; the desire that Jeremy Corbyn be the Prime Minister; the 
expectation that Theresa May will remain the Prime Minister. Yet when the 
sciences look to investigate the human mind, the place they typically begin is 
the brain. However, it is unclear how the content of a that clause might be 
‘read off’ somebody’s brain, or indeed any other part of their body.  
 
Another difficulty is that the mental has been taken to involve normativity. 
First, in respect of the content of mental states. Suppose somebody believes 
that David Cameron was the Prime Minister. This is apparently a thought 
that only David Cameron having been Prime Minister could be in accord 
with. That is to say, whether or not David Cameron was ever Prime Minister, 
the belief in question is the belief that it is in virtue of its accordance with 
that state of affairs. Here, however, the notion of accord is a normative one, 
and as in the case of moral facts, the sciences do not make use of normative 
notions. 
 
A second respect in which the mental is said to be shot through with 
normativity is traceable to Davidson. Davidson argued that the mental 
properties are constitutively normative insofar as their purpose is to make 
the actions and behaviour of sapient creatures intelligible from the 
standpoint of rationality. Davidson’s idea is that explanations that involve 
ascribing beliefs, desires and other propositional attitudes are explanations 
that show how a subject’s behaviour is in accordance with the demands of 
rationality (or deviates from them in intelligible ways). This sort of 
explanation—one in which things are made intelligible in terms of how 
things rationally ought to be—is to be contrasted with the sort of 
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explanation that is characteristic of the natural sciences—one in which 
things are made intelligible in terms of how things normally unfold. 
 
Thus, these five areas—meaning, mathematics, morals, modality and 
minds—create difficulties for scientific-naturalists. For each there is a 
question raised about their place in the natural world. However, it should be 
noted that the five Ms do not exhaust the areas where naturalism creates 
difficulties for conventional wisdoms; they are simply the areas to which 
analytic philosophers have paid the most attention over the past century. 
Other areas that are apparently left out of a world delineated by the natural 
sciences might be thought to include aesthetics, literary criticism, 
economics, political science, geopolitics, and many more. 
 
The tension between the common-sense world the world as described by 
the natural sciences that philosophical naturalism raises, then, is not simply 
confined to a few choice areas of philosophy. It is pervasive. There is, as 
Sellars put it a clash between the ‘manifest’ image of the world and the 
scientific image of the world. 7   
The space of possibilities 
The difficulty that naturalism confronts us with, then, is that there appear to 
be more truths in the common-sense, manifest worldview than can be 
accommodated by the natural sciences. This begs the question of how these 
truths are to be placed in the natural world. Broadly speaking, there are 
three strategies that can be pursued. 
 
The first option is reductionism. Reductionism in the context of naturalism 
involves giving an account of recalcitrant phenomena using conceptual 
resources that are at home in the natural sciences; for example, an account 
of the mental in terms of neurophysiology. Such an account would involve 
identifying mental facts with neurophysiological facts. The key reductionist 
claim would be that that neurophysical facts just are the mental facts—there 
                                                          
7 (Sellars W. , Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, 1963, p. 6) 
13 
 
is nothing more to the mental than the neurophysical. The placement 
problem is resolved by showing that the apparently recalcitrant facts 
actually turn out to be nothing more than straightforwardly acceptable 
scientific facts. 
 
The second option is to bit the bullet. It acknowledges that that the 
common-sense manifest worldview does not slot easily into the world as 
described by the natural sciences, and responds by denying that the 
common-sense, manifest worldview is true. In response to the clash 
between the manifest image and the scientific image, its response is “More is 
the pity for the manifest image.” The second option thus reconciles 
recalcitrant areas by denying that their realms contain any facts at all. 
 
Clearly, this neutralises the threat that areas such as the mental and morals 
pose to scientific-naturalism. However, it leaves the scientific-naturalist in 
the difficult position of having to explain away the apparently assertoric 
discourses that are built around the recalcitrant areas. When we ascribe 
mental states to our colleagues or issue moral pronouncements to errant 
youths, is it simply that we have fallen into an enormous collective error, 
though perhaps an error that has convenient and beneficial outputs? Or is 
the mistake here not one committed by language users, believing certain 
statements to be true that are not, but rather an error of theorists who have 
mistakenly taken moral discourse, say, to be in the business of stating 
truths. Such are the paths that biting the bullet forces. 
 
The final option for dealing with the problem of placing recalcitrant 
phenomena in the natural world is expansionism. This option attempts to 
push back on the constraint imposed by scientific-naturalism. According to 
the expansionists, the placement problems are generated by the excessively 
parsimonious constraint on the natural adopted by scientific-naturalists. 
The placement issues can thus be resolved by making   
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There are clear difficulties in this approach. If the constraint is relaxed to 
excessively, the basic insight of naturalism—that explanations that invoke 
mysterious and occult processes are not admissible—is lost. This raises the 
question as to whether the constraint imposed by scientific-naturalism can 
legitimately be relaxed. A question that becomes more pressing the further 
that constraint is pushed. However, if the constraint is not relaxed 
sufficiently, it cannot will not allow the recalcitrant facts to be placed in the 
natural world. 
 
The third option therefore, involves contesting the scientific-naturalist’s 
conception of what is properly considered to be natural. For the scientific 
naturalist, the natural world is defined by the natural sciences, and given 
that the natural world is the only world that there is, the only facts are those 
enumerated by the natural sciences.  
 
The expansionist view, however, has it that there are ineliminable facts that 
are perfectly natural, in the everyday understanding of the term ‘natural’, 
that cannot be reduced to those of the natural sciences. The natural world 
includes more facts than are enumerated by the natural sciences, but that 
does not render them queer or mysterious. The resultant view is a more 
liberal naturalism.8 
 
There are two ways that the expansionist might attempt to push the 
boundary outwards. On the one hand, it could be understood as a question 
about what constitutes ‘science’. An argument for expansionism that 
proceeded along these lines might look at enterprises that could be 
considered to be on the edges of the natural sciences, for example, the social 
sciences and the humanities, and argue for them to be accorded the same 
kind of legitimacy as the harder sciences. 
 
                                                          
8 The term ‘liberal naturalism’ is adopted in (De Caro & Macarthur, 2004) and (De Caro & 
Macarthur, 2010), but originates with John McDowell. 
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A second, more radical way of relaxing the constraint on the natural world 
imposed by scientific naturalists would be to challenge the use of the natural 
sciences as the tools by which the natural world is demarcated. According to 
this view, science in an important and valuable tool that can be used to 
investigate and discover facts about the natural world. It is not, however, all 
that there is to nature. 
 
This could be mistaken for a merely definitional issue. At the outset of his 
book, Philosophical Naturalism, Papineau writes: 
 
“What is philosophical "naturalism"?  The term is a familiar one 
nowadays, but there is little consensus on its meaning.   For some 
philosophers, the defining characteristic of naturalism is the 
affirmation of a continuity between philosophy and empirical 
science.  For others the rejection of dualism is the crucial 
requirement.  Yet others view an externalist approach to 
epistemology as the essence of naturalism.  
 
“I shall not engage directly with this issue.  It is essentially a 
terminological matter.  The important question is which 
philosophical positions are right, not what to call them. I suspect that 
the main reason for the terminological unclarity is that nearly 
everybody nowadays wants to be a "naturalist", but the aspirants to 
the term nevertheless disagree widely on substantial questions of 
philosophical doctrine.  The moral is that we should address the 
substantial philosophical issues first, and worry about the 
terminology afterwards.  Once we have worked out which 
commitments ought to be upheld by philosophers who aspire to 
"naturalism", then we can agree to use the term accordingly.”9 
 
                                                          
9 (Paineau, 1993) 
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Papineau is surely correct that that nearly everybody wants to be called a 
naturalist. In the modern world, few are content for their theories to be 
included in the same camp as miracles and magic with respect to the natural 
world. However, Papineau is wrong to think this is an essentially 
terminological matter that can be sidestepped. The question is ultimately 
what sorts of facts and things are properly taken to be part of the natural 
world? Papineau wants to ignore this question, and look at the substantive 
philosophical theories of those who aspire to the term “naturalism”. 
However, the validity and the motivations behind the substantive theories 
that Papineau wants to concentrate on are not independent of what can be 
properly said to be part of the natural world. As McDowell puts it: 
 
“It would be a cheat, a merely verbal manoeuvre, to object that naturalism 
about nature cannot be open to question. If we can rethink our conception of 
nature… we shall by the same token be rethinking our conception of what it 
takes for a position to be called ‘naturalism’.”10 
 
The points at which the three views outlined above touch upon one another 
is interesting. For instance, though expansionists and bullet biters might 
appear to be at opposite extremes they are in agreement on a crucial 
point—a restrictive naturalism based on the hard sciences leaves no place in 
the world for folk psychological concepts.  
 
Quine and McDowell, for example, are at opposite ends of the spectrum of 
how parsimonious the philosophers should be on naturalistic grounds. On 
the one hand, for Quine, the natural world is the world demarcated by the 
hard sciences. He famously says, “Naturalistic philosophy is continuous with 
natural science… My naturalism has evidently been boiling down to the 
claim that in our pursuit of truth about the world we cannot do better than 
our traditional scientific procedure, the hypothetico-deductive method.”11 
On the other hand, McDowell In his book Mind and World, argues that we 
                                                          
10 (McDowell, 1996, p. 77) 
11 (Quine, Naturalism; or, living within ones means, 2004, p. 281) 
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should “rethink our conception of nature” to make room for a sui generis 
domain of normative facts and eschews what he calls “bald naturalism”, 
which tries to identify the natural world with the realm of natural laws 
demarcated by the sciences .12 
 
Both agree, however, that assuming a restrictive naturalism based on the 
hard sciences, there would be no place in the world for folk psychological 
concepts. This pushes Quine and McDowell down opposing routes. For 
Quine, it is a broadly eliminativist route; for example, in Word and Object, 
where he suggests without an attempt at a reduction replacing the 
vocabulary of mental states with the vocabulary of physical correlates, or in 
Epistemology Naturalised where he advocates supplanting traditional 
epistemology with psychology. McDowell, on the other hand, takes the 
incompatibility of folk psychology and a restrictive naturalism as a 
motivation for an expansionist line of thought, which is a central theme of 
his Mind and World. 
 
This divergence, however, stems from a fundamental agreement on the 
impossibility of reconciling the scientific worldview with the common-sense 
worldview. It is at this point that supporters of reductionism would clash 
with McDowell and Quine. They are in conformity with Quine and 
disagreement with McDowell, insofar as they subscribe to a restrictive 
naturalism based on the hard sciences. However, they are in disagreement 
with both Quine and McDowell insofar as they hold that a restrictive 
naturalism can embrace folk psychological concepts on the ground that the 
facts of folk psychology are ultimately reducible to the facts of the hard 
sciences.     
 
Such disputes show that the question of how high to set the bar for a theory 
to count as naturalistic is not a merely definitional question—the 
considerations that inform the correct answer are substantive. They are 
                                                          
12 (McDowell, 1996, p. 77) 
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capable of driving theorists in different directions, and limit or de-limit the 
space of possibilities in various ways. Surely this is not simply to attain a 
label. 
My Strategy  
In this thesis, I will argue that Scientific-Naturalism cannot give an adequate 
account of meaning, understanding and the mental. Further, I claim that this 
should not drive us towards a more modest account of the world that either 
excludes these phenomena, or gives an account of them as something less 
than they are. Instead, we should seek an account that still deserves to be 
called naturalistic, but is inclusive enough to allow us to retain our intuitive 
understanding of mind, language and the other recalcitrant areas referred to 
above. In other words, I will be adopting the expansionist approach, 
outlined in the previous section, to reconciling naturalism with the 
common-sense, everyday truths of the manifest image. 
  
In rejecting scientific-naturalism, the liberal-naturalism that the 
expansionist approach yields does not seek to defend the supernatural or 
the occult. Like scientific-naturalism, it denies the existence of such entities 
and phenomena as gods, ghosts, ghouls and magic. Nor is it unscientific, 
insofar as it does not contradict the propositions of the most current 
science, homeopathy or intelligent design, or deny that science is a 
legitimate and indeed essential form of inquiry.13 Instead, Liberal-
Naturalism denies the claim that science has a monopoly over legitimate 
explanations of reality; a claim that is arrived at through philosophy rather 
than science.14 Thus, Liberal-Naturalism stands opposed not to the sciences, 
but to scientism—a dogmatic belief in the universal authority of the natural 
sciences to the exclusion of all other bodies of knowledge and methods of 
inquiry. 
 
                                                          
13 It must be remembered that scientific-naturalism as a thesis about the nature of nature is not 
itself in the cannon of the sciences. It is a distinctively philosophical thesis. 
14 See (Bilgrami, 2010, p. 29) on this point. 
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In this first chapter of the thesis, I have outlined the tension that exists 
between the world as described by the natural sciences and the world as 
understood according to the common-sense, manifest picture, and the 
difficulties that this tension generates when combined with scientific 
naturalism. I have also outlined the three strategies available to resolve the 
tension—reductionism, biting the bullet, and my preferred solution, 
expansionism—and mapped out some of the connections between them. 
 
My argument for expansionism is two pronged. First, I will attempt to 
undermine the two alternatives. In Chapter 2, I argue that facts about 
meaning and mental content cannot be reduced to scientific concepts. In 
Chapter 3, I argue against the idea that these phenomena can simply be left 
out of our world picture. The upshot is that neither reductionism or biting 
the bullet can succeed in relieving the tension between the common-sense 
picture and the scientific picture. 
 
After showing that reductionism and biting the bullet are viable possibilities, 
it might be thought that expansionism is the unproblematic default choice. 
However, this would be mistaken. The tension between the scientific picture 
and the common-sense picture is created only when the two are combined 
with scientific-naturalism. That folk psychology is recalcitrant to 
subsumption under the natural sciences would not be a problem unless one 
thought that the natural world was demarcated by the natural sciences.  
 
Thus, in order to clear the way for expansionism, it is necessary to question 
the idea that the natural world is demarcated by the natural sciences. This is 
the second prong of my argument for expansionism. It amounts to the 
reimagining of nature that McDowell’s comments above envisage, and 
questioning what the appropriate basis of naturalism is. In Chapter 4, I look 
at the motivations that underpin scientific-naturalism, and I attempt to 
undercut them, thereby opening the possibility of an expansionist resolution 
to the tension between the common-sense and scientific pictures of the 
world. 
20 
 
 
Finally, in Chapter 5, I examine the naturalist credentials of the liberal-
naturalism produced by the expansionist approach, and ask just what earns 
it the right to be called a form of naturalism. I also address some possible 
challenges to these credentials. 
 
Before moving on to the task at hand, however, I want to address a question 
that might be raised about my strategy.  
 
It is more common for discussions of naturalism to take place when 
embedded within a field of philosophy where it is a live issue—meta-ethics 
or the philosophy of mind for example.15 Thus far, and in the chapters that 
follow, I have been considering naturalism tout court. However, it might be 
asked whether there is a single thesis or theory that is operative in each of 
these fields that might be dubbed “naturalism” or “scientific-naturalism”. 
Certainly, it is rarely stated in explicit form. Perhaps naturalism when 
considered in ethics, mind, and mathematics cannot be unified into a single, 
univocal concept.  
 
I think this view is mistaken. Certainly it is an accurate observation that 
some form of naturalism is very rarely stated explicitly as premise or a 
thesis in the views in which it is operative. However, this does not mean that 
it is not lurking in the background to much philosophical theorising. It is my 
contention that the central motivation for favouring reductive, eliminativist, 
fictionalist and expressivist views in a range of areas of philosophy is and 
overly scientistic attitude that involves holding the natural sciences to be 
the only game in town. As a result, a general approach to the question of 
naturalism can shed light in all areas where this attitude is possible.  
                                                          
15 Even McDowell’s Mind and World, which might be argued to have spurred interest in 
naturalism as such, is contextualised to a particular problem of how to locate experience as a 
transaction in nature. Notable exceptions to this include (De Caro & Macarthur, 2010), (De Caro 
& Macarthur, 2004) and (Price, 2011). 
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Chapter 2 – Reductionism 
The first strategy that a scientific-naturalist might take to domesticate the 
common-sense, manifest view is reductionism. According to reductionism, 
some entity or fact x is reducible to y just in case x can be shown to be 
constituted by, or at least fully explained by, y without remainder.  
 
Strictly speaking, reductionism itself is ontologically neutral with respect to 
its chosen reduction base. However, in the context of scientific naturalism, 
the only legitimate reduction base there could be are the facts and entities 
posited by the natural sciences. According to this form of reductionism, 
then, the seemingly recalcitrant facts and entities put forward by the 
common-sense manifest world-view are in fact constituted by facts and 
entities that are already at home in the scientific world-view.  
 
Reductionism, therefore, reconciles the common-sense picture with the 
scientific picture by showing that they are one and the same. The parts of 
the common-sense picture that seemed out of sync with the scientific world-
view are, upon closer inspection, just plain old scientific facts after all. 
Resolving the clash, for the reductionist, is a matter of pairing up the 
recalcitrant bits of the common-sense framework with candidates in the 
scientific world view that show promise as potential constitutors. Such 
pairings might include, mental facts and neurophysical facts; epistemology 
and psychology; meaning facts and facts about behavioural inputs and 
outputs; moral properties and the natural properties that occur in situations 
that demand moral judgements.  
 
By showing that the recalcitrant facts can be fully explained in terms of the 
scientific facts, or even better, constituted by them, reductionism can 
thereby retain the parsimonious ontology and metaphysics of scientific 
naturalism, without forcing us to give up the common-sense picture of the 
world. The common-sense picture just turns out to be subsumable by the 
scientific picture. If, for example, we succeed in reducing mental states to 
brain states, that part of the common sense picture will figure in the world 
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as described by the natural sciences—thoughts would be part of the world, 
specifically as part of people’s brains. 
  
Clearly, however, it is not simply good enough to pair up areas of the 
common-sense framework and the scientific framework. Otherwise the 
apparent clash between the manifest image and the scientific image would 
simply not arise. There is work to be done to demonstrate that the 
candidates for reduction are genuinely reducible to the proffered reduction 
base. 
 
An example of a reduction that appears to have been carried through 
successfully is that of heat to molecular motion. We can explain how it is 
molecular motion that produces the sensation of heat when it comes into 
contact with our nervous system, we can explain how molecular motion 
causes the mercury in a thermometer to rise and we can explain how 
molecular motion can be transferred from a hot object to a cool object in 
terms of the ‘excitement’ of the molecules that comprise the latter. In short, 
the causal roles that were associated with heat, even before it became 
apparent that heat is just molecular motion, can be fully explained in terms 
of molecular motion, with nothing crucial left out. 
 
Thus, in order for a successful reduction of certain elements of the common-
sense picture to be achieved, it would be necessary to show that all of their 
functions and workings can be explained in terms of something contained 
within the reduction base available to the scientific naturalist. Any 
attempted reduction of the mental, for example, would at the very least have 
to consider the causal roles that beliefs have—the actions that they 
contribute to, the further beliefs they engender, the emotions they produce, 
etc.—and explain such behaviour in terms of some class of scientifically 
respectable item.  
 
The reduction would be further complicated by the fact that not all the 
functions of belief appear to be merely causal—beliefs can stand as reasons 
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for other beliefs. Thus, a reduction of the mental to the physical would also 
have to include within its ambit the role that beliefs play in rational 
explanations as well as the roles they play in causal explanations. 
 
My strategy for dealing with reductionism will not try to critique every 
attempted reduction of the recalcitrant to the scientific that philosophy to 
date has offered up. To do so would take a lifetime (perhaps this is evidence 
that the project is destined to be fruitless). Instead, I will focus on two areas 
where reductionism has been common place—the mental and meaning and 
understanding. I will run through some of the flaws with the reductionist 
strategies in these areas and ultimately argue that no such reduction is 
possible in these two areas. 
 
Showing that the mental and linguistic meaning are irreducible to the 
natural sciences would, on its own, constitute an argument that 
reductionism cannot work as a strategy to demonstrate that reductionism 
could not reconcile the clash between the common-sense, manifest view and 
the scientific picture. The two areas are too fundamental to the common-
sense picture to be left out of the world.  
 
Simply ending matters on the irreducibility of the mental and meaning 
could, however, leave open the possibility of a dual strategy of reconciling 
the common-sense, manifest view with the scientific picture. Such a strategy 
might attempt a reductionist resolution of certain parts of the common-
sense world-view, i.e. those parts of it that do not concern mental and 
meaning facts, and then attempt to reconcile what is left over (minds and 
meaning) with the scientific picture of the world by other means. 
 
I have already said what such other means might be in the previous chapter, 
and in the next chapter, I will attempt to close down these alternative 
means. This should be sufficient to render any attempt at a dual strategy 
fruitless. However, I will also say something in this chapter about difficulties 
that afflict reductionist accounts more generally.  
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The Irreducibility of Meaning 
Linguistic meaning and understanding are often taken to pose a problem for 
scientific-naturalism. It might be though that insofar as language is 
manifested in the physical behaviour of human beings, it is would be an 
ideal candidate for scientific reduction with behavioural responses and 
physical inputs as putative candidates within for the reduction base. 
 
This is essentially what Quine attempts to achieve in his stimulus-meaning 
theory. According to the theory, meaning-facts are not mysterious facts 
recalcitrant to scientific treatment, they are simply facts about the 
behavioural dispositions of speakers. Quine introduces the idea by 
considering how a monoglot anthropologist might approach the language of 
an alien culture.  
 
Simply, through observation Quine notes, the “radical translator” can adduce 
a translation of the alien language.16 To do this, the translator matches up 
environmental stimuli with linguistic behaviour, noting, as in Quine’s 
example, that “Gavagai!” is uttered in the presence of rabbits, and only in the 
presence of rabbits. For a subject mean there is a rabbit by “Gavagai!” is 
simply for the subject to be disposed to utter or assent to “Gavagai!” when a 
rabbit stimulus comes into contact with the speaker.17 Quine summarises 
his view: 
 
“The stimulus meaning of a sentence for a subject sums up his 
dispositions to assent to or to dissent from the sentence in response 
to present stimulation.”18 
 
                                                          
16 Chapter 2 of (Quine, 2013) 
17 A ‘rabbit stimulus’ need not be an actual rabbit, but could equally be retinal patterns of light 
or neural stimulation of the same type as rabbits engender applied directly to a speaker’s body, 
i.e. without the presence of an actual rabbit. 
18 (Quine, 2013, p. 30) 
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According to Quine’s stimulus-theory of meaning, then, there is nothing 
more to facts about linguistic meaning than the subject’s dispositions in 
response to physical stimuli.19 On the face of it, such a view does not 
postulate any queer ontology and seems perfectly open to scientific 
investigation, and is thus perfectly congenial to scientific naturalism. 
 
However, as Quine notes, when meaning is put on this scientific footing, the 
meaning-facts that form part of the common-sense picture appear to be 
radically under-determined by the scientific facts. Consider, for example, 
that we are asked to decide if “Gavagai!” means “there is a rabbit”, “there is 
an undetached rabbit part” or “there is a temporal rabbit stage”. The 
observable stimuli and the dispositional responses are consistent with each 
of the three meanings. The data available to the radical translator is not 
sufficient to pick out one meaning from the multitude of possible options. 
 
At issue here is that meaning is constituted not simply by use, but correct 
use. Approaching language use in a scientific spirit, as Quine’s radical 
translator does, limits the possible data to how language is actually used—
the actual stimuli and the actual responses elicited. However, actual use is 
not sufficient to determine one meaning from many possible options. In 
order to underpin the meaning facts, we need to appeal to something 
stronger than what stimuli actually elicit the words of a speaker. We need 
instead to know what it is that makes a speaker’s utterances correctly 
uttered—is it rabbits, or undetached rabbit parts.  
 
                                                          
19 As a matter of Quine exegesis, it might be debated whether Quine is a reductionist or an 
eliminativist about meaning. Quine himself is slippery on this issue. Consider the following 
passage: 
 
“[S]timulus meaning as defined falls short in various ways of one’s intuitive demands on 
“meaning” as undefined… Yet stimulus meaning, by whatever name, may be properly looked 
upon still as the objective reality that the linguist has to probe when he undertakes radical 
translation… We do best to revise not the notion of stimulus meaning, but only what we 
represent the linguist as doing with stimulus meanings.” (Quine, 2013, p. 35) 
 
For my purposes, however, it is possible to take it as given that the relation of stimulus meaning 
to common-sense meaning is reductive. 
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This is the insight that meaning and understanding are, in some sense, 
normative. The point is more basic than simply as a means to overcome 
Quine’s inscrutability of reference. When somebody understands the 
meaning of a word, she is obliged to use it in a particular way – her linguistic 
behaviour must accord with her understanding. For example, for somebody 
who correctly understands the word “green”, her understanding is 
something that must accord with descriptive applications of the word to 
things that are actually green. This is just what it is to understand ‘Green’. 
Where it was found that somebody frequently used ‘green’ differently, we 
would call into question either her eyesight, or her understanding. 
 
Thus, understanding a word, and using it meaningfully, commits one to a 
certain pattern of use. Without such a normative constraint, it is difficult to 
see how an utterance could be meaningful at all.  
 
Clearly, this creates difficulties for scientific naturalism. Normative facts do 
not feature within the conceptual repertoire of the natural sciences, and 
therefore, for a scientific-naturalist, they cannot be part of a true account of 
meaning and understanding. The normativity of meaning, however, requires 
that they must be. A common strategy for scientific naturalism is to attempt 
to introduce the normative constraint in a way that appeals only to the 
resources available to the natural sciences, in effect reducing the normative 
constraint to a more naturalistic phenomenon. 
 
Crispin Wright’s Wittgenstein offers a representative example of such a 
strategy. Motivated by scientific-naturalism Wright’s Wittgenstein recoils 
from the idea that understanding might consist in a sensitivity to norms that 
demand a word be used in a particular way, on the grounds that this view 
implies a picture in which ones understanding of a word mysteriously 
prejudges an infinity of potential cases as correct or incorrect applications of 
the word.  
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Consider, for example, the instruction “add 2”. On an ordinary 
understanding, whether or not any given step in the series is in accord with 
the original instruction is determined in advance by the meaning of the 
instructor’s words. However, the question might be raised, in virtue of 
which natural facts could such a determination be performed. Given that 
there is an infinity of numbers in the series, nothing about the instructors 
past behaviour could show yet to be encountered steps to be in accord with 
the original instruction.  
 
At this point, the scientific-naturalist might appeal to the instructor’s 
depositions to assent to the various steps in the series. The difficulty here is 
that there are some numbers that are simply too large for any human to 
consider, calculate and assent to them. Given that we take the meaning of 
“add 2” to settle the question for every point in the series, even those stages 
we cannot compute, the dispositional facts seem to be ruled out. Nor is it 
clear how an appeal to the dispositional facts could make room for error on 
the part of the instructor. 
 
Restricted to the sorts of facts allowed by the natural sciences, nothing 
seems available to determine whether all of the steps in the series “add 2” 
are in accord with the original instruction. Wittgenstein himself gives voice 
to the sense of puzzlement: 
 
“Whence this determining of what is not yet there? This despotic 
demand?”20 
 
The only way to preserve our ordinary conception of meaning appears to be 
to extend the range of admissible facts beyond those countenanced by the 
natural sciences. Clearly, however, this path cannot be left open to the 
scientific-naturalist. 
 
                                                          
20 Section 437 of (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 2010) 
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Instead of what the scientific-naturalist would regard as a mysterious 
Platonism, Wright’s Wittgenstein holds that we should think of 
understanding a word in terms of “certain subrational propensities towards 
conformity of response, towards going on in the same way.”21 In other 
words, when somebody is taught to use a word, she is brought to use it in 
approximately the same way as her tutor, and those who share the tutor’s 
language, through something like conditioning.  
 
This part of explanation accounts for a certain mystery. Namely, how is that, 
perhaps with some teaching, people can go on to use their words in the 
same way as each other when they encounter new and novel contexts for 
their application. The Platonist might explain how two speakers agree in 
their response when confronted with a previously unencountered green 
item in terms of their mutual grasp of meaning-facts about “green”; for 
example, knowledge about what “green” means in English. Wright, however, 
appeals instead to a tendency of human beings to “go on” in the same way as 
each other; in this case, that is, a tendency to classify the same things 
together, and adopt equivalent standards of sameness, at least when it 
comes to colour. 
 
However, thus far, the normative element is still missing. Without it in the 
picture we do not have a picture of meaning and understanding, only 
conformity of response. Wright’s method of introducing a normative 
element is by adopting a communal constructivism about meaning.22  
 
Constructivism steps in as an attempt to give us something more than mere 
conformity by providing the normative constraint we began with. 
Constructivism holds that rather than particular applications of a word 
being correct or incorrect in advance of their occurrence, in virtue of what 
the word means, whether a person’s application of a word is correct or 
incorrect in any given case is determined by the verdict of her community. 
                                                          
21 (Wright, 2001, p. 124) 
22 For examples, (Kripke, 1982) and (Wright, 2001) 
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To march in step is to be correct, while to march out of step is to be 
incorrect. Thus, the possibility of a gap between the individual and her 
community steps into the void left by the expulsion of unscientific norms 
from the world, and opens up the possibility of being in error, with error 
understood as being out of sync with the community. 
 
However, it might reasonably be asked if communal agreement is really 
sufficient to provide the sort of normativity that legitimate accounts of 
meaning require. While the community steps in to provide the space for 
error at an individual level, there is no standard over and above the verdicts 
of the community. When it comes to applying determining the correctness of 
an application of a word in a new case, anything the community says, goes. 
This amounts to little more than making up meaning as we go along. 
 
Consider, for example, the grue-predicate envisaged by Nelson Goodman. An 
object is grue if and only if it is observed before t and is green, or else is not 
so observed and is blue. Suppose somebody questioned whether in a given 
community “green” meant green, or it meant Grue. According to the 
constructivist, there would be no fact of the matter either way until we 
actually arrived at t and the community delivered its verdict.  
 
It seems clear from such cases that, although appealing to the community 
might enable us to make sense of individual error in way that 
dispositionalism does not, it does no better at extending correctness 
conditions to new and unconsidered cases. Without this, the idea that there 
is a fact of the matter about whether a word means one thing rather than 
another is lost, and with it, the idea that words can genuinely mean anything 
at all. 
 
John McDowell has spoken of a natural understanding of meaning, in which 
it is correct to think of it in “contractual terms”: 
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“Our idea is that to learn the meaning of a word is to acquire an 
understanding that obliges us subsequently—if we have occasion to 
deploy the concept in question—to judge and speak in certain 
determinate ways, on pain of failure to obey the dictates of the 
meaning we have grasped; that we are 'committed to certain patterns 
of linguistic usage by the meanings we attach to expressions'”23 
 
This seems correct as an account meaning as it figures in the common-sense 
framework. However, it depends on the existence of meaning-constituting 
norms that determine correctness conditions for previously unencountered 
cases. Thus, in order to domesticate this part of the common-sense manifest 
picture to the world as described by the sciences, it is necessary to also 
domesticate norms. This would be to overcome the naturalistic fallacy, and 
seems like an impossible task. Reductive attempts to do this in the 
philosophy of language through appeals to the dispositions of speakers and 
community do not succeed. 
The Irreducibility of the Mental  
Another central area of the common-sense, manifest view of the world that 
has been taken to involve normativity is the mental. Indeed, the same 
considerations that apply to linguistic meaning should also apply to 
intentionality in general. Intentional mental states are, after all, things with 
which only certain states of affairs will accord—an expectation that such 
and such will happen, is essentially something that can only be satisfied by 
such and such; the wish that things are thus and so would not be the wish 
that it is if it were not something that could only be satisfied by things 
turning out thus and so. 
 
The latter example of a wish brings out the sense in which its ‘satisfaction’ is 
a thoroughly normative issue. One early account of the content of 
intentional states that was motivated by scientific-naturalism appeals to 
                                                          
23 (McDowell, 1984, p. 325) 
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causation.24 For example, Russell outlined a view according to which 
whatever causes a wish to go away is to be identified with its content: 
 
“A hungry animal is restless until it finds food; then it becomes 
quiescent. The thing which will bring a restless condition to an end is 
said to be what is desired. But only experience can show what will 
have this sedative effect, and it is easy to make mistakes. We feel 
dissatisfaction, and think that such-and-such a thing would remove 
it; but in thinking this, we are theorizing, not observing a patent fact. 
Our theorizing is often mistaken, and when it is mistaken there is a 
difference between what we think we desire and what in fact will 
bring satisfaction.”25 
 
Thus, according to Russell’s theory, what makes my wish a wish specifically 
for food, is that only food can cause the wish to go away.  
 
The flaw with the view, however, is noted by Wittgenstein when he draws 
out the logical implications of Russell’s view: 
 
“If I wanted to eat an apple, and someone punched me in the 
stomach, taking away my appetite, then it was this punch that I 
originally wanted.”26  
 
Now, Russell’s theory could be saved if we were willing to abandon the idea 
that the content of a subject’s own beliefs is transparent to her. Indeed, 
Russell appears to advocate such a view in arguing that only experience can 
show what our wishes and desires are desires for. “Theorising”, as he puts it, 
is subject to error. 
 
                                                          
24 For example, (Ogden & Richards, 1923) and (Russell, 1921). That scientific-naturalism is such 
an enduring theme in philosophy is evidenced by the fact that the view, in more sophisticated 
forms, is still present today, in the work of Fodor for example.  
25 (Russell, 1921, p. 32) 
26 Section 22 of (Wittgenstein, 1975) 
32 
 
The idea, however, that somebody might mistakenly think himself hungry 
only to discover that all he wanted was a punch in the stomach is sufficiently 
ridiculous to show that this strategy cannot work. Nor does Russell’s theory 
give a satisfactory account of beliefs. Suppose, as Proust does in In Search of 
Lost Time, that the taste of a madeleine was to cause me to entertain or 
recall beliefs that at least purported to be about a long forgotten aunt. The 
Russellian view appears to be committed to the questionable notion that I 
am mistaken in thinking that my beliefs are about my aunt, and in fact, they 
are about madeleines.  
 
What is evident from these considerations is that causal connections do not 
provide a sufficiently strong connection between the content of intentional 
mental states and the states of affairs that would accord with them to 
explain intentional content. Although a punch in the stomach might remove 
the wish to eat, it does not accord with the wish to eat in the same that 
having a meal would have done. The notion of accord or satisfaction in play 
here is a normative one. As we saw in the preceding section, however, 
normative notions create difficulties for scientific naturalism. 
 
In the course of the rule-following passages, Wittgenstein considers the 
view that intentional mental states are not intrinsically normative, in the 
sense that they sort out those states of affairs with which they accord and 
those which they do not. According to the view, it is only in virtue of 
supplying one of any number of possible ‘interpretations’ to the mental state 
that it can be said to be in accordance with a state of affairs. Such a view 
holds the obvious attraction to the scientific naturalist of removing the 
difficult normative characteristics  
 
As Wittgenstein points out, however, such a view can lead to a regress. If the 
supplied interpretation that is supposed to divide possible states of affairs 
into those that are in accord with the mental state and those that are not is 
itself normatively inert, then it cannot perform the task required of it. The 
interpretation, Wittgenstein suggests, would itself stand in need of an 
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interpretation if it is to perform the task required of it. As Wittgenstein puts 
it, “any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and 
cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine 
meaning.”27 
 
In a discussion of the rule following passages, McDowell considers what a 
view according to which it is denied that the mental is essentially normative 
implies for an ordinary case of belief: 
 
“Suppose I am struck by the thought that people are talking about me 
in the next room. The hypothesis implies that only a state of affairs in 
which people are talking about me in the next room would be in 
accord with my thought. Now [the thesis that mental states are 
normatively inert] implies that whatever I have in my mind on this 
occasion, it cannot be something to whose very identity that 
normative link to the objective world is essential. It is at most 
something that can be interpreted in a way that introduces that 
normative link, although it can also be interpreted differently. (‘I am 
free in the future to interpret it in different ways.’) Considered in 
itself it has no relations of accord or conflict to matters outside my 
mind, but just ‘stands there’. The regress of interpretations will then 
preclude conceiving the thought, considered as something to whose 
identity it is essential that it is to the effect that people are talking 
about me in the next room, as something I have in my mind at all. 
What I have in my mind is at most a potential vehicle for the 
significance in question, in the sort of way in which a sentence, 
considered as a phonetic or inscriptional item, is a vehicle for a 
significance that it can be interpreted as bearing.”28  
 
It seems, then, that intentional content cannot be accounted for unless it is 
granted that intentional mental states are essentially normative. At best, if 
                                                          
27 Section 198 of (Wittgenstein, 2010) 
28 (McDowell, 1992, p. 46) 
34 
 
intentional mental states are to be conceived as normatively inert, as they 
must be according to scientific-naturalism, intentional mental content 
disappears from the picture altogether. At best, mental states could only 
ever be potential vehicles for intentional content. 
 
In addition to applying the core thought of the preceding section to 
intentional content, however, there are also independent reasons for 
thinking that scientific-naturalism cannot accommodate the mental within 
its worldview.  
 
The simplest and most satisfying approach for the scientific-naturalist to 
naturalize the mental is a straightforward reduction to properties and 
events that are unproblematically scientific. The prime candidate to 
constitute the reduction base, here, is neurophysiology. 
 
However, Hornsby has made a powerful argument against the possibility of 
this.29 The argument goes like this. Imagine we have complete knowledge of 
the neurophysiology of a person, S. Suppose, then, that S performs an action, 
say raising her arm. According the assumptions of the thought experiment, 
we know all of the neurophysical events involved in the aetiology of S’s 
action. Now, suppose we were to ask, which neurological event can be 
identified with the mental event caused S to raise her arm? 
 
Hornsby plausibly claims that there are no plausible candidates amongst the 
neurophysiological events that lead to S’s raising her arm that we could 
naturally pick out as the mental event that caused the action. The problem is 
that the question ‘Which neurophysiological events are the mental events?’ 
involves a jump from the macro-level at which we ascribe mental properties 
to S, to the micro-level of neurophysiology. Neurophysiology discriminates 
events far more finely than folk psychology, and as a result there is no 
principled way to distinguish between those neurophysiological events that 
                                                          
29 (Hornsby, 1997) 
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constitute mental events and those which are merely its proximate causes 
and effects.  
 
Perhaps, it might be suggested, we could concatenate a set of neurophysical 
events that occupied the same spatio-temporal dimensions that a mental 
state responsible for S’s action might plausibly be thought to occupy. The 
difficulty with this, however, is that there is no obvious, non-arbitrary basis 
available to the scientific naturalist according to which S’s neurophysical 
events could be combined to form a new event. Clearly, a reductive account 
could not appeal to the spatio-temporal dimensions occupied by the S’s 
mental states as a principle on which to combine events as this would be 
circular.  
 
Only if were possible, in principle, for events to be concatenated wholly 
arbitrarily to form new events—what Hornsby calls the mereological 
conception of events—would the right kind of neurophysical event be 
available. It is dubious, however, that such a permissive conception of 
events is possible. For example, the event formed by combining Caesar’s 
crossing the Rubicon and Britain voting to leave the European Union seems 
highly artificial. It is not the sort of event that could provide any explanatory 
value.  
 
Similarly, a concatenation of neurophysical events that occupied the same 
spatio-temporal dimensions as a mental state that caused the raising of an 
arm might plausibly be thought to occupy would surely not be of the right 
sort to pull its weight in neurophysical explanations. Yet, it is a 
neurophysical explanation of the mental that such a reductive account is 
supposed to yield. According to Hornsby, when we do neurophysiology, “We 
examine events at a degree of resolution that we never need to achieve in 
order to make sense of one another.”30    
 
                                                          
30 (Hornsby, 1997, p. 68) 
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Although Hornsby’s argument is directed at Davidson’s claim that every 
mental event is token identical with a physical event, it touches upon a claim 
made by Davidson in his argument for the irreducibility of the mental to 
physical laws. Davidson writes: 
 
“When we use the concepts of belief, desire, and the rest, we must 
stand prepared, as the evidence accumulates, to adjust our theory in 
the light of considerations of overall cogency: the constitutive ideal of 
rationality partly controls each phase in the evolution of what must 
be an evolving theory.”31  
 
This idea that rationality plays the role of a constitutive ideal when it comes 
to the mental is the idea that the purpose of ascribing propositional 
attitudes to a creature is to make that creature’s behaviour intelligible in 
light of considerations about what it ought to do from the point of view of 
rationality.   
 
Neurophysiology, on the other hand, attempts to make sense of events in by 
placing them in a context of how things usually unfold—that is, in the 
context of law like regularity. Indeed, it would be impossible for a 
neurophysiological account to even begin making a person intelligible in the 
way that folk psychology does. Relations such as consistency, coherence and 
being reasonable in light of are relations that only hold between items with 
propositional contents, such as beliefs, desires and intentions. The 
conceptual repertoire of neurophysiology, however, is blood, bone and grey 
matter, and it is difficult to see how one neural event might make another 
reasonable, rather than merely causing it. For this reason, it is unsurprising 
that the events of neurophysiology do not simply map onto the events we 
are concerned with when we attempt to make sense of each other using 
psychological concepts. As Davidson puts it, the considerations we bring to 
                                                          
31 (Davidson, 2001a, p. 223) 
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bear when ascribing propositional attitudes have “no echo in physical 
theory”.32  
The Explanatory Gap 
In the preceding two sections, I have argued that meaning and intentionality 
are irreducible to the conceptual apparatus of the natural sciences. In both 
cases, it is the normativity associated with both concepts that causes 
difficulties. I know want to end this chapter by saying something more 
general about reductive strategies in respect of normative phenomena. 
 
Statements like “Heat is molecular motion” are explanatory because our 
knowledge of physics and chemistry makes it intelligible how something like 
molecular motion could make the mercury in thermometers to expand, hot 
gasses to rise and cold gasses to sink. Once we understand the mechanism 
by which these things are produced, there is nothing left unexplained that 
the reductive theory must explain. 
 
Things are different, however, in the case of neurophysical events and 
beliefs. It might be thought that, at least from a broad schematic, point of 
view, identifying neurophysical events with beliefs opens a route to 
explaining how beliefs cause actions. There is, after all, a causal chain of 
events between an arm’s going up and the brain. Similarly, all modes of 
perception that culminate in empirical beliefs involve causal links between 
events in the external world and events in the brain.  
 
However, a substantial parts of the common sense story remain unexplained 
on such a reductive account. Those elements are the normative parts of the 
story. How, for example, could experience justify an empirical belief on a 
reductive account rather than merely cause it? Similarly, how could a belief 
justify another belief rather than merely cause it? When reductive accounts 
of normative phenomena are proposed, an explanatory gap emerges in a 
way that it does not for phenomena such as heat.  
                                                          
32 (Davidson, 2001b, p. 231) 
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This sort of explanatory gap was first noted by Levine in respect of qualia 
and their phenomenal properties. Suppose it is proposed that pain is 
reducible to the firing of C-fibres. Although there is a causal link between the 
pricking of somebody’s skin with a needle and the excitement of her C-
fibres, there is no obvious connection between the firing of C-fibres and how 
pain feels that would enable the firing of C-fibres to explain why pain feels 
as it does. It could be asked why the firing of A-fibres or B-fibres does not 
feel the same, and no explanation in neurophysiological terms would be 
forthcoming.33 
 
Levine suggests that one way of dealing with the explanatory gap would be 
to admit recalcitrant phenomena such as qualia and normativity into our 
world-view as “brute facts”. That is to say, they simply have to be taken as 
given and admit of no explanation in more fundamental terms.  
 
For the scientific-naturalist, it is in principle possible to make such a move. 
For example, it might have turned out that the most fundamental level of 
explanation at the atomic level was in terms of neutrons and protons 
without compromising scientific-naturalism. As it happens, however, it was 
discovered that there is a more fundamental level of explanation, whereby 
the behaviour of protons and neutrons could itself be explained in terms of 
the properties of quarks. The point is that both sets of facts could have been 
accepted as fundamental without compromising scientific-naturalism—
neutrons and protons would have been allowable as brute facts had it 
turned out that there was no such thing as a quark. 
 
However, this does not seem possible for the case of normative phenomena. 
Levine notes that in order to determine when there is an explanatory gap 
and when there is not, it is necessary to have a theoretical account of what it 
is for a phenomenon to be rendered intelligible without the need for further 
                                                          
33 (Levine, 1983) 
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explanation. It would tell us what sort of things we are allowed to accept as 
bedrock without providing further explanations, and what sorts of things 
require further explanation.  
 
It should be clear that scientific-naturalism is an attempt at such a 
theoretical account. According to scientific-naturalism, explanations given in 
terms of the natural sciences may serve as bedrock, but where a 
phenomenon has not been explained in terms of the natural sciences, 
further explanation is required. Explanations may reasonably come to an 
end as long as we are in the domain of the natural sciences, even though one 
scientific account of the world may be explained in terms of another, more 
fundamental scientific theory.  
 
It seems clear that normativity considered as such is not a concept that is at 
home in the domain of the natural sciences. Therefore, on scientific 
naturalism’s theoretical account of when further explanation is required, 
normative phenomena will always produce an explanatory gap that must be 
filled. Facts that involve normativity cannot be accepted as brute facts, 
without further explanation in scientific terms. 
 
The normative phenomena that form part of the common-sense, manifest 
picture include at least ethical, and as I have argued above, mental and 
meaning facts. Mathematics can also be plausibly included. Now, if a 
reductive strategy of reconciling the common-sense and the scientific image 
is to be pursued, what is required is a reduction of the normative to the non-
normative. This, however, seems to be an impossible task. 
 
It might be objected, here, in a scientific spirit, that it is not possible to judge 
from the armchair whether or not such a task is impossible. Although, an 
account of normative features of the recalcitrant parts of the common-sense 
framework may well seem impossible now, who are we to say what will 
seem possible or impossible in the light of a future science?     
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Such an attitude would, I think be mistaken. The sorts of explanations at 
which the sciences excel really do seem to be of a fundamentally different 
kind than the sorts of explanations that normative phenomena permit. The 
natural sciences place events in the context of how things normally unfold in 
accordance with natural laws, while normative phenomena place events in 
the context of right and wrong.  Accepting the naturalistic fallacy seems like 
too high a price to pay to hang on to a reductive scientific-naturalism. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that reductive strategies to reconcile the common-sense 
picture with the scientific picture of the world do not succeed. In particular, 
the normative aspects of facts about meaning and intentionality render 
them unsuitable for scientific reduction. I have further argued that any part 
of the common-sense framework that involves normativity—which includes 
at least, meaning, minds, morals and mathematics—will create an 
unbridgeable explanatory gap for a reductive scientific naturalism. 
 
At the end of his article on the explanatory gap, Levine concludes that the 
only way to circumvent the explanatory gap is to take a more “eliminationist 
line” to the recalcitrant phenomena. I consider such approaches in the next 
chapter.  
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Chapter 3 – Biting the Bullet: Eliminativism, Fictionalism and Expressivism 
In the previous chapter, we saw that reductionism does not offer the 
scientific-naturalist a way of reconciling the common-sense, manifest 
picture of reality with the scientific picture. Faced with the irreducibility of a 
phenomenon, scientific-naturalism has another option. It can simply accept 
that some parts of the common-sense picture really are just irreconcilable 
with the scientific picture and bite the bullet. If meaning and mental facts 
cannot be stated in the vocabularies of the natural sciences, then so much 
the worse for meaning and mind.  
 
Rather than reverting to a pre-theoretical worldview, the irreducibility of 
phenomena to the natural sciences forces the scientific-naturalism to purge 
the world of the recalcitrant phenomena. On this view, of mental properties, 
meanings and any other properties that are not reducible to the sciences are 
simply not part of the furniture of reality. Below, I will address three forms 
that such a purging of reality can take: eliminativism, fictionalism and 
expressivism. 
Eliminativism 
The first means of purging reality of recalcitrant facts and properties is 
eliminativism. According to eliminativism, statements that belong to the 
fields that cannot be reduced to the natural sciences are simply false. 
Although folk linguistics and folk psychology suppose that there are such 
things as meaning facts and mental facts, the theories of the folk are not as 
advanced as those of the scientist. Just as early theories about the supposed 
ether through which light propagated, or the phlogiston which combustible 
materials contained were false, so too are beliefs about mental properties 
and the meanings of words and sentences. According to the eliminativist, 
minds and meanings are just the latest in a series of large scale errors that 
have occurred throughout human history that the natural sciences have set 
right. 
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Eliminativism is supposed to be made innocuous by the claim that we can 
‘get by’ just as well without the eliminated concepts. Indeed, not only get by, 
but perhaps get by more easily. For scientific-naturalists, philosophy is 
continuous with the sciences, and supplanting mental concepts with 
neurophysical ones should be seen like any other scientific advance. Nobody 
complained that the world was being purged of a luminiferous aether when 
Einstein’s more useful theories supplanted it; it was simply accepted that 
the aether did not exist. Nor did people complain about the disappearance of 
phlogiston when combustion was discovered to involve oxidation. Its 
elimination was taken to be essential to a better explanation of combustion  
 
In this spirit Quine, attempts to diffuse the apparent radicalism of the 
elimination of the mental by suggesting that there is not much difference 
between eliminating the mental altogether and improving our account of it. 
 
“Is physicalism a repudiation of mental objects after all, or a theory of 
them? Does it repudiate the mental state of pain or anger in favor of 
its physical concomitant, or does it identify the mental state with a 
state of the physical organism (and so a state of the physical 
organism with the mental state)…  Some may therefore find comfort 
in reflecting that the distinction between an eliminative and an 
explicative physicalism is unreal.”34 
 
It is questionable, however, whether the analogy with scientific advances 
really holds here. A switch from folk psychology to neurophysiology without 
eliminating the explanatory gaps discussed in the last chapter really does 
seem like a change of subject. A more explicit justification of eliminativism is 
therefore required rather than the sleight of hand Quine provides. 
 
Rorty attempts such a justification. To demonstrate the point, he 
hypothesises a race of creatures, the Antipodeans, who never developed 
                                                          
34 (Quine, 2013, p. 244) 
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mental concepts, and use neurophysiological descriptions where we would 
use sensation language.35 Had we spoken Antipodean all our lives, Rorty 
claims, “No predictive or explanatory or descriptive power would be lost.”36 
For Rorty, using a mental vocabulary has served only to bog philosophers 
down in problems that can be avoided simply by discarding that vocabulary. 
 
There are two things that should be said about Rorty’s view. Firstly, it is 
questionable that Antipodean has the same descriptive and explanatory 
power as our own sensation language. Normally, when we ask if somebody 
is in pain, we are not interested in her neurons, but rather her pain. 
Secondly, Rorty only applies the Antipodean example to sensation language. 
This begs the question, would there be no loss of explanatory power if 
propositional attitudes were also replaced by Antipodean? Anybody who 
accepted Rorty’s argument when applied to sensations would surely be 
more dubious about this. Ascribing beliefs, desires and reasons allows us to 
explain behaviour in a way that ascribing quivering neuron bundles does 
not: as the behaviour of a rational agent. 
 
In any case, eliminativism is something of a rash step to take when faced 
with the irreducibility of meaning and the mental. These phenomena appear 
to permeate our engagement with the world and each other.  
Fictionalism 
A stronger palliative than those offered by eliminativism is fictionalism. 
Fictionalists share the view of eliminativists on the status of recalcitrant 
areas of the common-sense picture—they are not really part of the world, 
and the statements that constitute mathematical, ethical and mental 
discourse are false. However, eliminativists are wont to compare the 
erroneous bits of the common-sense framework to past scientific theories 
that have been supplanted by more useful ones and are therefore to be 
                                                          
35 (Rorty, 1981) Chapter 2 
36 (Rorty, 1981, p. 120) 
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discarded. Fictionalists attempt to chart a route to salvage bits of the 
common-sense framework. 
 
The salvaging move that fictionalism performs cannot involve vindicating 
the veracity of the recalcitrant parts of the common-sense framework. It is a 
defining feature of fictionalism that it regards such statements as false, or as 
the name suggests, as fictional.  
 
At this point, fictionalism deploys the idea of a useful fiction. Although 
mathematical, ethical and mental statements are literally false, according to 
fictionalism, they serve purposes other than stating facts that render them 
useful or beneficial in some other way. A fictionalist treatment of moral 
discourse, for example, might take it that moral statements make false 
claims to the effect that moral facts obtain, but serve the further purpose of 
regulating behaviour when, for example, they are used as admonishments.  
 
Fictionalism thus combines the ontological view of eliminativists—that the 
recalcitrant areas of the common sense picture are not really part of the 
world—with a linguistic attitude. This linguistic component can be broken 
into two parts. First, the statements that constitute the recalcitrant areas of 
discourse have a literal semantic content that falsely describes the world as 
being a certain way—for example, as containing numbers. Second, in 
addition to the literal, descriptive content of the recalcitrant discourses, they 
have a pragmatic purpose—some function or use that is not constituted 
simply by claim-making. 
 
It is in virtue of this pragmatic element of language use that fictionalists 
think the common-sense framework worthy of saving. The fictionalist 
strategy for achieving this is by encouraging more enlightened speakers to 
view the recalcitrant discourses as convenient fictions. Recalcitrant 
discourses would then proceed on the analogy of discourses that involve 
overt fictions. Although, strictly speaking, “Darcy married Elizabeth” is 
false—because Darcy and Elizabeth are not real—within the fiction of Pride 
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and Prejudice, “Darcy married Elizabeth” is true. Furthermore, when 
speakers utter the sentence, although they say something that is strictly and 
literally false, they are not attempting to commit themselves to the actual 
existence of Mr Darcy or Elizabeth Bennett, their claims are supposed to be 
taken as relativized to the fictional world of the novel. 
 
 
Similarly, speakers with more enlightened meta-ethical beliefs may continue 
to use moral statements with a force akin to the statements made about 
novels. Moral claims such as “Slavery is wrong”, need not be understood as 
committing speakers to anything about the actual world, but rather as 
moves within the fiction of ethical discourse. Similarly, negative claims such 
as “It is not the case that abortion is wrong” are not to be understood as 
statements that are simply true because there are no moral facts, but rather 
as claims that are contentious, within the fiction of ethical discourse. 
 
In the literature, there are two ways of understanding fictionalism about 
particular kinds of discourse. Hermeneutic fictionalism about a discourse is 
a thesis about how a discourse actually operates. According to hermeneutic 
fictionalism about ethics, speakers are actually making statements that are 
assessed for their truth relative to the fiction that is ethics. Revolutionary 
fictionalism, on the other hand, is a thesis about how a discourse ought to 
operate. Revolutionary fictionalism about ethics would hold that people only 
ought to make statements about an ethical world that is taken to be fictional.  
Note that this is consistent with an account of how people actually use 
ethical language according to which they take themselves to be making 
statements about a non-fictional ethical world, contrary to hermeneutic 
naturalism. Revolutionary naturalism is so named because, if hermeneutic 
naturalism is false, it would require a radical revision of how ethical 
discourse actually operates.37 
                                                          
37 The original distinction between hermeneutic and revolutionary fictionalism comes from 
(Burgess & Rosen, 1997, p. 6) in the context of nominalism. It is introduced to fictionalism by 
(Stanley, 2001). 
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Thus, on the fictionalist account, the scientific picture is triumphant when it 
comes to the contents of reality—the only truths are the truths of the 
natural sciences—it refuses to dispense with the discourses that constitute 
the common-sense framework, as eliminativism does on account of the 
pragmatic value. Instead, it uses the model of fictional discourse to salvage 
the common-sense framework from abandonment. 
 
Both revolutionary and hermeneutic fictionalism appear to depend on 
believing untruths, or at least behaving as if one does in order to uphold the 
pretence. As Berkeley put it, “we ought to think with the learned and speak 
with the vulgar.”  
 
One might reasonably ask whether such a view is it consistent with 
scientific-naturalism. Strictly speaking, it is consistent with scientific-
naturalism. In taking statements that invoke recalcitrant areas of the 
common-sense framework to be literally false, it does not invoke a suspect 
ontology. Nor does is it required to employ any questionable philosophical 
methodology in giving an account of the pragmatic purpose of fictionalist 
discourse. All that this requires is for the theorist to take up a stance similar 
to that of the anthropologist, and observe what language users do with their 
utterances. Thus, on the face of it, fictionalism appears to be consistent with 
scientific-naturalism. 
 
One might reasonably wonder, however, whether fictionalism is really in the 
spirit of scientific-naturalism. The question of how the theoretical stance of 
the fictionalist, as an observer of the recalcitrant discourse, interacts with 
the practical stance, as an active participant, that she must also adopt when 
moralising, modalising, calculating and perhaps even while philosophy, 
raises a number of questions.  
 
Scientific-naturalism is clearly linked to the values of science, and one of 
these values is surely not permitting or persisting with untruths when a 
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more credible theory is in the offing. Although the scientific-naturalist is not 
required to hypothesise queer ontologies or unscientific methods as a 
theorist, engaged in providing an account of language and the world, she 
does seem to be required to advocate such an ontology and unsound 
methods when engaging in recalcitrant discourses as an active participant as 
opposed to a passive theorist attempting to give a naturalistic account of 
such practices from the outside. 
 
It might be objected here that the scientific-naturalist is not required to 
actually believe in an unscientific ontology in order to practically engage in 
the discourse, she need only behave as if there were such an ontology. 
However, even this more modest shirking of one’s responsibility to the truth 
as a norm of inquiry is not obviously in line with the spirit of scientific 
naturalism.  
 
Moreover, it seems as if the fictionalist, having come to her more refined 
view of the recalcitrant areas of discourse, is required to keep up the 
pretence. If all participants in moral discourse, say, were to adopt a 
fictionalist account ethics, it is questionable whether the pragmatic function 
that constitutes the discourse’s saving grace could be preserved. 
Participants might reasonably ask, if moral statements are false, why should 
I be moral? The fictionalist must therefore treat the recalcitrant area of the 
common-senses picture as a noble lie, which hardly seems within the spirit 
of scientific-naturalism. 
Expressivism 
A third way in which a scientific naturalist might bite the bullet that does 
not suffer from the difficulties involved with fictionalism is to adopt some 
form of expressivism. Expressivists take the fictionalist claim that 
statements in the recalcitrant areas are not best seen as aiming at literal 
truth a step further. According to expressivists, statements in the 
recalcitrant areas are not really genuine statements at all. That is to say, the 
utterances of these discourses do not express a content that is truth-apt. 
48 
 
Instead, the recalcitrant discourse in question has some other function or 
purpose which is expressed in that discourse. 
 
Expressivism is most commonly found in ethics. Typically, expressivism in 
ethics holds that the utterances that form part of ethical discourse do not 
describe the world, but rather express attitudes of approval or disapproval 
on the part of the speaker. However, expressivism is also found in other 
areas of philosophy. Brandom, for example, provides an expressivist account 
of logic according to which the logical connectives make explicit (i.e. 
express) the form of different kinds of more primitive ‘materially good’ 
inferences.38  
 
Similarly, Brandom also has expressivist account of propositional attitude 
ascription. Very roughly speaking, rather than propositional attitude 
ascriptions being in the business of representing the mental facts associated 
with a subject, Brandom thinks that switching between de re and de dicto 
attitude ascriptions enables an ascriptor to make explicit, or express, the 
substitutional inferences of an ascriptee that the ascriptor is willing to 
endorse.39 This is not the place to delve further into Brandom’s account of 
propositional attitude ascription. The point, rather, is that although 
expressivism is most commonly thought of as being a position in moral-non-
cognitivism, it has a potentially wide application.    
 
The unique features of expressivism are best brought out in contrast with 
fictionalism. According to the fictionalist, statements in the recalcitrant 
discourse are literally false. The recalcitrant discourse can be continued, 
                                                          
38 According to Brandom’s account, one can infer “The roads are wet” from “It’s raining outside” 
without an additional premise to the effect of “if it’s raining outside then the roads will be wet”. 
For Brandom, such an inference is treated as basic, or primitive. The incorporation of logical 
vocabulary into a language simply enables speakers to make such inferences explicit, for 
example, by saying “if it’s raining outside then the roads will be wet”. See Chapter 1 of 
(Brandom, Articulating reasons: An introduction to inferentialism, 2009). 
39 A proper outline of Brandom’s account of propositional attitude ascription would require a 
discussion of his notion of deontic scorekeeping, and this is not the place for that. A précis of 
Brandom’s view can be found in Chapter 5 of (Brandom, Articulating reasons: An introduction to 
inferentialism, 2009) with the full treatment in Chapter 8 of (Brandom, 1998). 
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however, if it can be reconceived as a convenient fiction. The assertion that 
“Slavery is wrong” would be viewed as literally false, but within the fiction of 
ethical discourse might be seen as true. 
 
For the expressivist, however, there is no need to accept galling claims to the 
effect that strictly speaking, it is false that slavery is wrong, or the perhaps 
even more egregious claim that, to the extent that it is true that slavery is 
wrong, it is only true within the context of a much wider fiction that is the 
entirety of ethics. For the expressivist, truth and falsity do not get a look in. 
Utterances such as “Slavery is wrong” are not the sorts of things that are 
liable to truth or falsity. 
 
Expressivism also avoids the need to reshape the practice of recalcitrant 
discourse in the way that fictionalism recommends. According to 
fictionalism, ultimately, the common-sense framework can only be salvaged 
if the statements that comprise it can be reconceived as being relativized to 
a convenient fiction—the convenient fiction that constitutes the manifest 
image. This implies that insofar as participants in the recalcitrant discourses 
that constitute the manifest image believe themselves not to be engaged in 
make belief, they must instead adopt a fictionalist outlook and amend the 
force of their utterances accordingly. In order to salvage the utility of the 
common-sense framework, large parts of ordinary discourse must shift from 
being fact-stating discourse to fiction-stating discourse. 
 
However, this attitude seems to violate an important principle that 
theorising in the philosophy of language should be subject to. This is the 
idea that linguistic practice must determine semantics. Robert Brandom 
puts the point like this: 
 
“Semantics must answer to pragmatics. The theoretical point of attributing 
semantic content to intentional states, attitudes and performances is to 
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determine the pragmatic significance of their occurrence in various 
contexts.”40 
 
If the fictionalist were to take her cue from pragmatics, however, it is 
difficult to see why it would be appropriate to ascribe a fictionalist 
semantics to the utterances of speakers. There is nothing apparent in 
ordinary practice the suggests speakers are engaged in, or take themselves 
to be engaged in make belief. That is not to say that these discourses must 
be assertoric in the sense of being truth apt—indeed, the expressivist will 
want to argue that they have different expressive function than claim-
making—rather it is to say that fictionalism seems to be particularly ill 
suited to describe the discourses that constitute the common-sense, 
manifest image as it is.  
 
The same point might be put by saying that the only sort of fictionalism 
there could be would be revolutionary fictionalism—a fictionalism that 
flouted the answerability of semantic theory to practice. In view of this, 
fictionalism is perhaps best conceived as an attempt to reshape apparently 
fact-stating common-sense discourse into a new but similarly useful fiction-
stating discourse.  
 
Expressivism on the other hand promises to leave the common-sense 
discourse in place. In its reconciliation of the common-sense, manifest image 
with the scientific image of the world, expressivism imputes error not to the 
participants in the discourse but rather to the philosophers of language who 
have attempted to give accounts of moral, mental or mathematical language. 
According to expressivists, the clash of images arises because philosophers 
have tended to explicate all meaningful units of language in terms of truth-
apt representational content. 
 
                                                          
40 (Brandom, 1998, p. 83) 
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Expressivism offers an alternative. Some parts of language are not in the 
business of representing the world to be a certain way at all. Brandom 
contrasts the two views nicely in his Articulating Reasons: 
 
“This representational paradigm of what mindedness consists in is 
sufficiently ubiquitous that it is perhaps not easy to think of alternatives of 
similar generality and promise. One prominent countertradition, however, 
looks to the notion of expression, rather than representation, for the genus 
within which distinctively conceptual activity can become intelligible as a 
species. To the Enlightenment picture of mind as mirror, Romanticism 
opposed an image of the mind as lamp.”41 
 
It is through this route that expressivism reconciles the clash between 
common-sense, manifest image of the world and the scientific image. If the 
recalcitrant discourses functioned on the representationalist mirror-model, 
they could never be saved because they do not mirror the world as 
described by the natural sciences (assuming scientific-naturalism is true and 
reductionism has been discounted). However, the expressivist says, 
recalcitrant statements are not in the business of representing the world to 
be a particular way.  
 
According to this view, the legitimacy of uttering “stealing is wrong”, “S is in 
pain” or “2 + 2 = 4” is not contingent on the obtaining of facts that cannot be 
reconciled with the natural sciences. The clash between the scientific image 
and the manifest image is revealed to be the product of an erroneous 
account of language.  
 
Expressivism is not, however, without problems. The manner in which it 
achieves its edge over fictionalism—by denying that language in the 
recalcitrant areas of the common-sense view is utilised in a way that admits 
                                                          
41 (Brandom, 2009, p. 7) 
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of truth or falsehood—has a bitter edge. Just statements such as “Slavery is 
wrong” cannot be said to be false, nor can they be said to be true. 
 
It might be thought that this is a price worth paying to salvage the 
recalcitrant parts of common-sense discourse. We lose the rather ersatz 
‘true within a convenient fiction’ that fictionalism can grant statements in 
these areas, but we no longer have to say that they are literally false.  
 
This response, however, brings out the fact that expressivism’s fidelity to 
linguistic practice is only slightly more genuine than that of fictionalism. In 
ordinary practice, after all, people do make utterances of the form “It is true 
that X is morally wrong”, “It is false that Jones believes P” and “P ^ ~P is 
false”. It would be difficult for expressivism to account for this fact in any 
other way than to ascribe error to language users in their application of the 
truth predicate. This would not be the sort of error in the use of the truth 
predicate involved when somebody makes a mistake about the subject on 
which they are speaking—“It is true that the war will be over by 
Christmas”—that any theory must take in its stride. Rather, this would be a 
more fundamental collective error on the part of the participants in a 
practice. They would be in error about the sort of practice they were taking 
part in.  
 
Ascribing this sort or error to language users would be to violate the 
principle that semantics must take its cue from practice. Certainly, 
expressivism takes a less radical departure from practice than fictionalism 
does. However, for a theory that purports to gain credence from its from a 
more faithful insight into what speakers are actually doing when they use 
language, such a departure is inexcusable. In the end, it turns out, a simple 
expressivism is only marginally better than the unsatisfactory fictionalism. 
Quasi-Realism 
A simple expressivism, as outlined in the previous section, runs afoul of the 
demand that semantics attempts to capture linguistic practice rather than 
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overturn it. However, there is a more sophisticated version of expressivism 
that attempts to overcome this.  
 
The more sophisticated version of expressivism proceeds in the same 
manner as outlined in the previous section. It argues that some language has 
an expressive rather than a representational function, and is thus not in the 
business of reflecting how things are in the mind-independent world, 
thereby opening the door to a dissolution of the clash between the common-
sense, manifest picture and the scientific image. However, in order to avoid 
the charge that is ignoring apparently realist features of discourses that 
must be held to be non-representational, it attempts to earn the right to all 
of the trappings of realist talk without endorsing a realist metaphysical 
stance. This is achieved through the by examining linguistic practices and 
attempting to find a better explanation of what speakers are using their 
words to do than the one offered by full-blown realists.  
 
This is project is known as ‘quasi-realism’. It’s founder, Simon Blackburn, 
describes the task, thusly: 
 
“The smooth clothing of statements proposed as true or denied as 
false disguises the living body beneath.  The expressivist task is to 
reveal that clothing for what it is—but that is not to say that we 
should always try to do without it.”42 
 
The realist clothing, as Blackburn puts it, will typically include the right to 
use predicates such as “… is true”, “… is a fact”, “… is a mind-independent 
fact” and other such locations in respect of the utterances of recalcitrant 
discourses. Also at issue will be the ability to use such utterances from non-
representational parts of language in inferences. This difficulty arises 
prominently in ethics as the ‘embedding problem’. 
 
                                                          
42 (Blackburn, 1998, p. 51) 
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Another difficulty will be showing how the sentences in the quasi-realist 
domain can be compositional, i.e. how the meanings of the sentences can be 
a function of its component parts, which is necessary to explain the 
learnability and productivity of languages. Representationalists will have 
little difficulty here, as they can simply rely on some form of word-world 
relation to give meaning to the component parts of a sentence. This is 
something the expressivist cannot rely on given that she regards one of the 
benefits of expressivism to be ontological parsimony. Instead, they will 
typically rely on word-word relations.43  
 
Quasi-realism, therefore, is more like a programme than a particular theory. 
However, the result of a fully worked out quasi-realism would enable 
scientific-naturalism to solve reconcile the scientific view of the world with 
the common sense view without resorting to any scientifically suspect 
metaphysics. It would do so while at the same time vindicating the 
discourses associated with the recalcitrant parts of the common-sense 
picture. 
 
In response to this, somebody who was concerned to preserve the common 
sense picture might well challenge the quasi-realist’s realist credentials. 
They may acknowledge that the quasi-realist account of the common sense 
picture has all of the trappings of a realist account, but when it comes down 
to it, the quasi-realist has it that important parts of the manifest image are 
not really real. Quasi-realism does pay lip service to realism, but ultimately 
it’s just lip service. 
 
The quasi-realist has a good response to this. Lip-service, she may say, is the 
whole point. Quasi-realism aspires to realist talk without the realism—that 
                                                          
43 On Brandom’s inferentialist account, for example, sub-sentential components have their 
meaning in virtue of what happens when they are substituted into sentences. If “Hesperus” can 
be substituted for “Phosphorus” in all sentences containing the latter without making any good 
inferences bad, or bad inferences good, then the two terms have the same meaning and 
contribute the same thing to any sentence in which they occur. Chapter 6 of (Brandom, 1998) or 
Chapter 4 of (Brandom, 2009)  
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is, without the same ontological and metaphysical commitments that a full-
blown realist account of the area in question would require. Moreover, in 
securing the trappings of realist language, the quasi-realist would have 
provided an account of what locutions such as “real” and “really real” 
amount to in the recalcitrant areas. Attempting to rebut quasi-realism by 
pointing out that according to it large parts of the common-sense picture 
would not really be real would, by the quasi-realists lights, simply 
presuppose an erroneous view of what speakers are actually doing in the 
area of language in question—a view that the quasi-realist would take 
herself to have rebutted in vindicating the use of realist locutions. 
 
The quasi-realist’s response works, however, it reveals a more fundamental 
difficulty. Quasi-realism typically goes about securing the trappings of 
realist talk by advancing minimalist theories of facts and truth. Such 
theories attempt to deflate apparently realist notions such as facts, truth and 
representation of any metaphysical pretensions. The upshot of this is that 
notions so deflated could be applicable to the recalcitrant bits of language 
without incurring metaphysical and ontological commitments that would 
conflict with the scientific-naturalist’s account of the natural world.  
 
Take minimalist theories of truth, for instance.  They begin with the thought 
that in ordinary discourse, saying “snow is white is true” is just another way 
of asserting that snow is white. Philosophical minimalism about truth is the 
idea that this feature of linguistic practice is all that there is to the notion of 
truth. Truth is not some heavy-duty metaphysical concept that must be 
understood by invoking ideas such as correspondence with the facts, rather 
it is merely a grammatical device for cancelling semantic ascent—a tool that 
can be used to move from mentioning a sentence to using it.  
 
Such a feature is manifested in Tarskian T-sentences such as the one below, 
where ‘S’ is mentioned on the left of the schema and used on the right: 
 
‘S’ is true if and only if S 
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According to the minimalist, giving a T-sentence for every sentence in a 
language, and you have said everything of substance that can possibly be 
said about truth in that language.  
 
The quasi-realist observes that a similar move can be made for other tools of 
the traditional realist’s trade: 
 
‘S’ is a fact if and only if S (And that is all there is to the notion of a fact) 
 
x has the property of F-ness if and only if x is F (And that is all there is to say 
about properties) 
 
‘S’ is really true if and only if S (And that is all there is to say about real 
truth) 
 
‘S’ is a mind-independent truth if and only if S (And that is all there is to say 
about mind-independent truth) 
 
Here, one might begin to wonder whether the quasi-realist can vindicate the 
right to realist talk without doing down real realist talk. One might 
reasonably ask if the realist talk in the recalcitrant domains is without any 
metaphysical substance or commitments, then why should the realist talk in 
non-recalcitrant domains? 44 Indeed, unless one wants to end up with a set 
of bifurcated notions such as truth and facts, extending minimalism to 
commonly accepted realist areas of discourse must be carried out. Indeed, 
some expressivists embrace this approach and adopt a global expressivism 
coupled with a minimalist strategy to deflate realist concepts of any 
metaphysics across the piste.45 
 
                                                          
44 Dreier suggests that similar problem of “creeping minimalism” occurs in ethics. (Dreier, 2004) 
45 (Price, 2011) and (Brandom, 1998) are two notable examples. 
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Now, perhaps the quasi-realist could give a plausible account of certain 
areas of discourse that would not bring with it any metaphysical or 
ontological commitments. However, it is implausible that this could be 
carried out across the board. Not only would the global quasi-realist deny 
that the best way of making sense of ethical talk was to suppose that the 
discourse depended on certain metaphysical commitments—a position that 
some might find plausible. It would also hold that even scientific discourses 
do not presuppose any metaphysical commitments. 
 
Perhaps a quasi-realist could concoct a story from the perspective of 
linguistic anthropology that was an internally consistent account of the 
sciences that did not conceive of it as answerable to how things are in 
nature. The point, however, is that such an account would surely be 
explanatorily inferior to the realist account. The best way to conceive the 
scientific enterprise is as an attempt to get one’s thinking and one’s language 
in accord with the facts. This implies that the discourse itself presupposes 
robust metaphysical commitments. 
 
This, I think, brings out a wider problem with biting the bullet strategies. 
With the exception of eliminativism, which does not even attempt to salvage 
the common-sense framework, they all attempt to leave in place the 
common-sense framework without securing answerability to the world. It is 
difficult to see how this could be acceptable to anybody who was concerned 
to preserve the common-sense, manifest picture could find this acceptable. 
If the correctness of moves in, say, mental discourse is not answerable to 
how things are with the purported subjects of mental ascriptions, this would 
constitute a radical departure from the ordinary picture of what this 
discourse involves.  
 
It has to be remembered that the common-sense, manifest picture of the 
world is, as the name suggests, a picture of the world. Any option that 
attempts to remove the answerability of mental or ethical discourse to how 
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things objectively are is inevitably going to be revolutionary, even if it comes 
with the trappings of realist talk. 
Conclusion 
In the above considerations, I have not demonstrated that biting the bullet 
strategies are not internally sustainable systems. I have only shown that 
anybody who wants to maintain the parts of the common-sense framework 
that are incompatible with the scientific-naturalism should not be satisfied 
by the palliatives offered by bullet-biting strategies. If one thought that 
scientific-naturalism was the only game in town, all this would succeed in 
doing would be to force an overtly painful choice between abandoning large 
parts of the common-sense, manifest picture, and abandoning a naturalistic 
world-view.  
 
This is the sort of choice that nobody would make if it were not forced. In 
the next two chapters, I show that the choice is non-compulsory. It is non-
compulsory because scientific-naturalism is not the only form that a 
naturalistic world-view can take. In the next two chapters, I first attempt to 
undermine the motivations of scientific-naturalism and reject it. I then 
defend the more liberal naturalism that results. The upshot is that one can 
maintain both the common-sense, manifest picture of reality without giving 
up a naturalistic worldview. 
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Chapter 4 – The Motivations for Scientific Naturalism   
In the previous two chapters, I have argued that neither reductionist 
strategies nor eliminativist strategies can succeed in reconciling the 
common-sense, manifest view of the world with the scientific-view of the 
world. This amounts to an argument for the incompatibility of scientific-
naturalism and the manifest image. It is not possible to domesticate the 
manifest image within the scientific image through reduction, and nor can 
the clash be dissolved by showing that an allegiance to manifest image can 
be retained without any ontological or metaphysical commitments. 
 
One option at this point would be to abandon our allegiance to the common-
sense manifest picture all together. This would be to accept that the 
palliatives that the more advanced bullet biting strategies offer are false 
promises, but insist that if one has to bite a bullet, better to deny the 
common-sense framework than scientific-naturalism.  I will argue, however, 
that it is scientific-naturalism can be abandoned without great loss.  
 
In this chapter, I will attempt to show that scientific naturalism is itself 
without independent foundation. I will do this by considering the 
motivations that might lead to it. I will focus on two claims. First, that the 
great success of modern science supports scientific naturalism. Second, that 
only a scientific account of the world could secure objectivity.  
The great success of modern science 
According to De Caro and Macarthur, the most popular argument for view 
that all there is to nature is what the sciences have to tell us proceeds from 
the great success of modern science.46 The argument notes that the 
advances of science have drastically improved our understanding of the 
world and humanities place in it, our technological capabilities, our ability to 
predict events, our economic well-being, our health and our quality of life 
more generally in innumerable ways.  
                                                          
46 (De Caro & Macarthur, 2004, p. 4); (McDowell, 1996, pp. 70-2) also suggests that scientific 
naturalism is motivated by the success of natural science. 
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Contrast these achievements to the non-scientific disciplines that aim to 
improve our knowledge and understanding of the world. For all the tombs 
of philosophical, historical, ethical, economic and political thought, it might 
be suggested, all that has been produced is a multitude of rival theories with 
little agreement about which are the superior, and no settled and 
determinate means of deciding between them. The sciences, on the other 
hand, have produced the theory of evolution, special and general relativity, 
the laws of thermodynamics, the sequencing of the human genome, to name 
but a few success stories, about which there is widespread agreement and 
demonstrable utility. 
 
The argument from the great success of modern science, draws from these 
considerations the conclusion that the sciences are the only game in town 
when it comes to understanding reality. Not only do the sciences provide the 
only legitimate means of discovering truths, according to the argument, but 
they provide the only legitimate means by which the natural world is 
delineated. 
 
Curiously, De Caro and Macarthur do not provide any examples scientific-
naturalists who explicitly make this argument. I suspect, however, that they 
are correct that considerations along these lines are motivating factors in 
the background of scientific naturalism. There is a tendency to think that its 
success is to the exclusion other disciplines. As C.P. Snow perhaps reveals 
when in his polemic lecture on The Two Cultures, he says that the scientists 
have “the future in their bones” while the non-scientific culture, which Snow 
refers to as “the traditional culture” (as well as “natural luddites”), would 
rather that the future did not exist.47  
 
Despite the paucity of examples, then, the argument is worth addressing 
explicitly. While there may be few examples of statements of global 
                                                          
47 (Snow, 2012, p. 12) 
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scientific-naturalism based on the great successes of modern science, there 
does seem to be an abundance of localised examples where the sciences 
have supplanted other modes of investigation as a result of their great 
successes.  
 
Take medicine, for example. It used to be the case that cures for diseases 
and ailments where sought through all manner of non-scientific means—
relics, occult healers, witch doctors, prayer, exorcism, etc. Now, however, 
while some people still swear by homeopathy or other forms of ‘alternative 
medicine’, most are correctly inclined to think that such enterprises are 
dangerously misguided. The application of the modern sciences in medicine 
has demonstrated its success and utility through the great advances in 
understanding of human physiology that have been achieved in the last few 
centuries, and the resultant profusion of cures and treatments that have 
been discovered for previously deadly diseases. Moreover, a scientific 
approach to medicine can take up and embrace within its explanatory 
framework any apparently positive effects that alternative medicines might 
have through concepts such as the placebo effect. 
 
In medicine, the abandonment of non-scientific modes of investigation and 
understanding really does seem to stem from the utility and achievements 
of the sciences, as opposed to the acceptance of some kind of metaphysical 
principle. I do not want to question this. Indeed, I take it that scientific 
investigation is the only form of investigation likely to yield truths and 
understanding of human physiology. What I want to question is the idea that 
local acceptance of the pre-eminence of the sciences could be transformed 
into, or perhaps even justify, the sort of global monopoly for the sciences 
that scientific-naturalism advocates. 
 
Perhaps it is not surprising that the argument for such expansionism is 
rarely stated, for it is clearly invalid. The claim that modern science has 
produced great advances is surely correct, but it does not support the 
conclusion that, in Sellars words, “In the dimension of describing and 
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explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, 
and of what is not that it is not.”48 Evidently, it is perfectly compatible with 
the sciences being extremely fruitful fields of great achievement that other 
forms of investigation can yield truth.  
 
Nor can the local acceptance of a monopoly of the sciences support a wider 
extension. It is unclear why the acceptance that science is the only game in 
town when it comes to medical discovery should license the claim that 
science is the only game in town tout court. Other areas of investigation, it 
might be claimed, have a fundamentally different nature than medicine and 
thus admit of different kinds of investigation, perhaps even forms of 
investigation that yield truths that the sciences could not. In chapter 2, I 
argued that meaning and the mental were two such areas. 
 
What, undoubtedly, the pre-eminence of the sciences in a field such as 
medicine should encourage, is the attempt to employ scientific methods in 
other related and, perhaps also unrelated fields. One might suppose, for 
example, that given the success of the scientific method in medicine, it might 
also lead to great advances in our understanding of the physiological 
mechanisms that underpin phenomena such as visual experience, thought 
and sensation. Indeed, one would be correct in thinking so given the 
achievements of cognitive science. However, it would be a further, 
unlicensed step to say that all there is to say about visual experience, 
thought and sensation can be said by the sciences.  
 
It seems to me that there are two means by which one might license the 
globalising move that results in scientific-naturalism. The first would be to 
accept some form of epistemological principle about non-scientific methods 
to the effect that they are not effective means of discovering truths. I suspect 
this is what most people who advocate a scientific approach to medicine, at 
least tacitly accept in a localised form—scientific investigation is the only 
                                                          
48 Section 42 of (Sellars W. , 1997) 
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effective means of coming to know about the ailments of the human body 
and the ways to treat them. To support scientific naturalism, the claim must 
a take a more global form—the sciences are the only effective means of 
coming to know about reality. 
 
Such an epistemological principle is perhaps suggested by the argument 
from the great success of modern science in its contrast of the sciences with 
other, non-scientific disciplines. The principle requires would, however, 
have to be extremely strong in order to license scientific naturalism. It 
would have to assert that the sciences are the only effective methods of 
investigation, which seems to imply that other forms of inquiry cannot yield 
truth or knowledge at all. Such a principle is clearly too strong, and indeed, 
patently false. 
 
Economics, for example, has manifestly yielded theories that have predictive 
and explanatory power, many of which can be credited with advances in the 
material wellbeing of society in the same way the sciences have. The 
acceptance of the Mundell-Flemming model, which tells us that that a 
country cannot simultaneously maintain a fixed exchange rate, the free 
movement of capital and an independent monetary policy, has put an end to 
frequent Sterling crises. The economics of information asymmetries can 
explain why insurance companies structure their products in the way that 
they do.49 Despite these successes, economics is frequently lampooned for 
not demonstrating the same convergent tendencies as the sciences are taken 
to have. (‘Ask two economists the same question and you’ll get three 
different answers’, ‘If you laid all the economists end to end you’d never 
reach a conclusion’, and so on). 
 
Political science has also yielded theories that exhibit predictive success. 
Professors of government can tell you with a reasonable chance of success 
how likely it is that a country which has undergone a democratic transition 
                                                          
49 Joseph Stiglitz won the Nobel Prize for work on this question. 
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will stay democratic based on its level of income and the number of years it 
has remained democratic. She would be able to say with some confidence 
how many significant political parties there are likely to be in a country 
based on the knowledge of its electoral system.  
 
Despite these successes, neither economics nor political science conforms to 
the picture of natural sciences embraced by scientific-naturalism. Both 
economics and political science seem to ineliminably presuppose parts of 
the common-sense framework. It would be impossible for either to be done 
without assuming the existence of rational agents acting for reasons and in 
light of values in ways that are not readily explicable in terms of the natural 
sciences. Indeed, some practitioners would argue that is the very subject 
matter of the disciplines. 
 
It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that it is only when parts of the 
common sense framework are elevated to a more rigorous footing that they 
can yield predictive success and truths. It is not just the social sciences that 
have yielded theoretical success. Surely the ascription of propositional 
attitudes to people also helps us explain and predict their behaviour. Not 
just in the laboratory setting and the SCR, but in everyday interaction 
between people. Indeed, that is often taken to be the point of such 
ascriptions.   
 
Similarly, other modes of investigation than science have led to 
improvements in the wellbeing of a great many people. The great moral 
achievements of the previous few centuries, such as the abolition of slavery, 
and the more general development of societies that are far more liberal and 
tolerant than any that have been seen previously, has little, if anything, to do 
with the sciences. Perhaps the sciences can inform such moral advances—
the scientific study of animals seems like a plausible area that might do so—
but it is not in the business of providing first-order moral insights. 
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The conclusion to draw from these considerations is that the 
characterisation of the non-scientific disciplines that the argument from the 
great success of modern science trades on to support the leap to scientific-
naturalism does not adequately credit their successes and utility. The 
epistemic principle on which the argument might trade—that the sciences 
are only effective means of discovering truths about the world—is simply 
false. 
 
I noted earlier that there are two means by which the globalising move 
might be made. The second is by motivating a metaphysical principle along 
the lines of—only the things and facts countenanced by the natural sciences 
are part of the world. Clearly, such a principle might underpin the epistemic 
principle discussed above. Similarly, it might be supported by evidence that 
the epistemic principle was true. If the sciences were found to be the only 
effective means of discovering truths about the world, it could be argued 
that that was because the scientific facts are the only facts there are. 
 
It seems clear that this latter argument for the metaphysical principle—
from the epistemological principle to the metaphysical principle—is the 
only way that an argument from the great success of modern science might 
proceed.50 I have already argued, however, that the epistemological 
principle is false. I therefore conclude that the argument for scientific-
naturalism from the great success of modern science does not succeed. In 
order to arrogate the sciences to the exclusion of other disciplines, it is 
necessary to supply an additional premise to that the fact that modern 
science has produced great successes and achievements cannot support.  
 
It may, however, be possible to motivate scientific naturalism by other 
means. Below, I consider two further arguments that are designed to 
support Sellars’ conclusion that science is the measure of all things. 
                                                          
50 A more direct argument that started with the observation that the sciences have had great 
success, but only in discovering objects and facts countenanced by the natural sciences, would 
evidently be circular. 
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Science, objectivity and the Archimedean viewpoint 
In the first chapter, I noted that scientific-naturalism begins to encounter 
trouble when human beings are considered. Indeed, Sellars famous contrast 
between the scientific image and the manifest image is fully rendered as the 
contract between the scientific image of man in the world and the manifest 
image of man in the world. 
 
One way of expressing this is to say that the common-sense, manifest 
picture of the world is anthropocentric. The idea is that the common-sense 
framework cannot be made intelligible without reference to the abilities and 
capacities that seem particular to humans. Such a view is perhaps most 
familiar in respect of some dispositionalist accounts of colour. According to 
such views, the property of being red is unintelligible without reference to 
how red things look to observers with a human perceptual system, or a 
sufficiently similar one. Similar points might can clearly be made in respect 
of conscious qualia. Pain, for example, plausibly cannot be understood 
without reference to what it’s like for somebody to be in pain.51    
 
Other parts of the common sense picture might also be taken to be 
anthropocentric in just this sense. McDowell has argued that moral 
properties can be understood as being analogous to secondary qualities.52 In 
the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that space, time and ultimately the 
self as the self-conscious subject of thought and experience, cannot be made 
intelligible apart from human modes of sensibility and thought. 
 
Similarly, Wittgenstein’s argument in the rule following passages can be 
taken as an argument that facts about meaning (and normative facts in 
general) are only intelligible against the background of human practice, or 
                                                          
51 (Nagel, 1974) makes this point in another way. 
52 (McDowell, 1988) 
67 
 
as Wittgenstein sometimes puts it, our “form of life”.53 He makes similar 
points in respect of mathematics. For example: 
 
“’But mathematical truth is independent of whether human beings 
know it or not!’—Certainly, the propositions ‘Human beings believe 
that twice two is four’ and ‘Twice two is four’ do not mean the same. 
The latter is a mathematical proposition; the other, if it makes sense 
at all, may perhaps mean: human beings have arrived at the 
mathematical proposition. The two propositions have entirely 
different uses. —But what would this mean: ‘Even though everybody 
believed that twice two was five it would still be four’? —For what 
would it be like for everybody to believe that? —Well, I could 
imagine, for instance, that people had a different calculus, or a 
technique which we should not call ‘calculating’. But would it 
be wrong? (Is a coronation wrong? To beings different from ourselves 
it might look extremely odd.)”54 
 
On each of these accounts, facts about norms, colours, meaning, minds or 
morals, are dependent in some sense upon a distinctively human standpoint. 
 
Now, philosophers who are concerned with what is really part of the world 
and what is not might be inclined to worry about anthropocentricity. If the 
common-sense framework is only intelligible against the background of a 
parochially human point of view, they might be tempted to suggest that it 
cannot form part of our conception of how the world really is in itself. 
According to such philosophers, reality itself is fundamentally third-
personal. All of the facts and properties that constitute it can in principle be 
described without essential reference to a particular point of view. Thus, 
norms, colours, meaning, minds, mathematics and anything else that 
                                                          
53 See, for example, (Wittgenstein, 2010) section 241. For a different argument to the effect that 
facts about language cannot be understood without reference to human capacities or interests, 
see (Wiggins, 1997, p. 518) 
54 (Wittgenstein, 2010) pt2. p.227-8 
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depends upon some local or parochial point of view are forced out of our 
conception of how the world objectively is.  
 
This view is discussed in detail by Bernard Williams in a way that connects 
it to scientific-naturalism. 55 Suppose there are two thinking subjects, A and 
B. A and B both have beliefs and experiences that represent the world to be 
a particular way. The way these beliefs and experiences represent the world 
to be may well be different—A may believe things to be thus and so, B may 
believe something else. If A’s and B’s beliefs are to be assessed for their 
correctness, what is required is a coherent way of understanding how and 
why their beliefs differ and how they relate to one another. For example, we 
might understand A and B as having different but compatible perspectives 
on the same object, contradictory beliefs about the same object with one in 
the right and one in the wrong, or believing different things about separate 
objects, etc.  
 
This further representation, which encompasses and relates the 
representations of A and B, is referred to by Williams as the absolute 
conception of reality. Williams argues that such a conception appears to be 
compulsory if we are to have a concept of reality as what is there anyway, 
aside from our own beliefs and viewpoint. This, however, leads to a regress. 
In order to form a conception of an independent reality, we are required to 
form an overarching representation that encompasses within in it all other 
representations, and relates them to one another and the world. However, 
this overarching representation would itself simple be another 
representation that would necessarily involve our own beliefs, forms of 
experience and thought and conceptual frameworks. As such, the 
overarching representation could be brought within an even more 
overarching representation.  
 
Williams expresses the concern in the form of a dilemma: 
                                                          
55 (Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, 2005) especially p.48-51 and p228-230 
69 
 
 
“On the one hand, the absolute conception might be regarded as 
entirely empty, specified only as ‘whatever it is that these 
representations represent’. In that case, it no longer does the work 
that was expected of it and provides insufficient substance to the 
conception of an independent reality; it slips out of the picture, 
leaving us only with a variety of possible representations to be 
measured against each other, with nothing to mediate between them. 
On the other hand, we may have some determinate picture of what 
the world is like independent of any knowledge or representation in 
thought; but then that is open to the reflection, once more, that that is 
only one particular representation of it, our own, and that we have no 
independent point of leverage for raising this into the absolute 
representation of reality.”56 
 
In the absence of some kind of Archimedean point, the regress of non-
absolute conceptions of reality could continue forever. This can make the 
regress seem inescapable. After all, strictly speaking, there can be no such 
thing as an Archimedean view if such a thing is understood as the view from 
nowhere, shed of anything particularly human or parochial. Any viewpoint 
or perspective on the world is perspectival as a matter of definition. 
 
Williams is sensitive to this. However, he suggests there is a way to halt the 
regress that does not trade on a dubious notion of an Archimedean point. 
According to Williams, the culmination of science that CS Peirce envisaged 
would furnish us with concepts that would not be peculiar to ourselves or 
relative to our experience. Although the idea of a view from nowhere, from 
outside all concepts, is a nonsense according to Williams, there is a 
possibility of a perspective that does not contain anything that unique to 
that perspective. Science steps in as a kind of transparent mode of access to 
reality. Though our beliefs about the world are necessarily adopted from a 
                                                          
56 (Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, 2005, p. 50) 
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particular viewpoint, scientific concepts do not smuggle in anything that 
reflects “merely a local interest, taste or sensory peculiarity.”57 
 
It is now clear how Williams discussion of the absolute conception of reality 
supports scientific-naturalism. The concept of objective reality, the 
argument goes, contains nothing that is perspectival or tied to any particular 
parochial point of view. Only scientific representation of the world contains 
no concepts that reflect local interests, tastes or peculiarities of sense or 
thought. Therefore, the only objective reality there could be is the one 
delineated by the natural sciences. Science is the measure of all things, of 
what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not. 
 
This argument, however, is flawed. First, it is not clear that the sciences 
succeed in avoiding parochialism any more so than our other endeavours. 
To begin with, the scientific method must to some extent be historically 
situated because the method of investigating the world is not independent 
of its results. Cloud chambers, which allow the trajectories of subatomic 
particles to be observed, where introduced into physics as a result of beliefs 
about the structure of the atom, not vice versa.  
 
The same is true for the more abstract parts of the scientific method. If some 
kind of Kantian or Wittgensteinian thesis about the particularity of human 
modes of thought is true it is unclear why the scientific method should be 
immune. Lear, for example, offers one such reading of Wittgenstein, which is 
explicitly indebted to Kant, according to which the form of human 
“mindedness” from which there is no getting outside of includes 
“perceptions of salience, routes of interest, feelings of naturalness in 
following a rule, etc. that constitute being part of a certain form of life.” 58  
 
All of the things Lear includes under the heading of mindedness seem to be 
relevant to theory choice in the sciences. One might also add standards of 
                                                          
57 (Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, 2005, p. 229) 
58 (Lear, 1982, p. 385) 
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good and bad argument, simplicity and elegance.  According to the Kantian-
Wittgenstein view, these abstract elements of the scientific method are 
embedded within parochially human forms of life.59 In this respect, the 
special methods of the sciences are no more able to achieve an Archimedean 
point than other methods of investigation. 
 
In an illuminating discussion of Sellars’ attempt to reconcile the scientific 
picture and the manifest image, Willem deVries accuses Sellars of “a subtle 
process/product” confusion.60 According to Devries, we can distinguish 
between the scientific method as a process and the scientific image of the 
world as its product. This distinction can also be put to some use in the 
context of Williams’ attempt. While the ‘product’, that is the structural 
description of the world in terms of particles, might appear not to depend 
upon parochial aspects of the human condition, the ‘process’ that yields it 
(the scientific method) most definitely does depend upon parochially human 
routes of interest, standards of similarity and feelings of naturalness in 
following a rule. Williams’ claim that science can halt the regress trades on 
the questionable idea that the ‘product’ of the sciences can be insulated from 
the ‘process’ by which it is uncovered.  
 
The second manner in which Williams’ argument fails is in the claim that the 
sciences can embrace within it and explain all representations. This was the 
key task of the absolute conception. However, the hypothesis with which we 
began was that some anthropocentric properties are unintelligible without 
reference to the human point of view, with colour properties and sensations 
being paradigmatic examples. Now, given that the concepts employed by the 
natural sciences are supposed to be free of local interest, taste or sensory 
peculiarity (though I have argued that this is questionable), it seems 
impossible ex hypothesi that representations of anthropocentric properties 
could be accounted for in scientific terms. 
                                                          
59 It is fitting that Williams himself has played a part in popularizing such a reading, (Williams, 
Wittgenstein and Idealism, 1973) 
60 (deVries, 2012, p. 13) 
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The reason for this is that part of what embracing the and explaining all 
other representations must involve for the absolute conception is embracing 
and explaining their content. This will include contents such as “The apple is 
red” and “I am in pain”. We might also take it to include cases of moral 
experience that at least represent moral properties as being part of the 
world.61 It would only be possible for the sciences to do this, however, if it 
were possible to render redness as an objective property intelligible without 
essential reference to how red things look to human beings. More precisely, 
it would require an account of redness in terms of the natural sciences that 
left nothing out, and the same for pain and ethical facts, too. Such an account 
does not seem to be in the offing. 
 
I conclude that the idea that the natural sciences provide a method of 
enquiry that can halt Williams’ regress is an error, and thus considerations 
about objectivity and the absolute conception cannot support scientific 
naturalism.  
 
What then for Williams’ dilemma? Without the natural sciences as a 
transparent mode of access to reality are we doomed to oscillate between its 
two horns, doomed to be without a conception of objective reality?  
 
I suspect the error here is to think that the only sort of facts are ones that 
are not dependent upon a particular point of view, hence Williams’ 
hankering for some sort of proxy for the Archimedean viewpoint. In reality, 
the only model available to us when we consider reality and our place in it is 
not Archimedean but Neurathian. Like Neurath’s sailor, there is no getting 
off our ship to survey its standing from “sideways on”, as John McDowell has 
put it. This should not, however, make us think the anthropocentric 
properties and enterprises, least of all science (!), are not really real. Instead, 
                                                          
61 Even a moral anti-realist can grant that value is so presented. 
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we should simply accept that they are essentially human concepts and 
enterprises, and that is to be expected, given that we are humans. 
Conclusion 
I have argued that the most popular argument for scientific-naturalism, 
according to De Caro and Macarthur—the argument from the great success 
of modern science—does not support the conclusion that science is the 
measure of all things. The great success of modern science is perfectly 
consistent with other modes of inquiry yielding knowledge and other kinds 
of non-scientific fact obtaining. In order to support an epistemic thesis that 
might license scientific-naturalism, the great success of modern science 
argument must play down the achievements of non-scientific disciplines to 
unacceptable levels. 
 
I further argued that a second method of supporting scientific naturalism, 
based on the third-personal, non-parochial character of scientific concepts 
and inquiry, cannot succeed either. The aspiration to an Archimedean view 
on which such an account trades can never be fulfilled. Nor can the sciences 
serve as a proxy for such a view. The sciences, like any other human 
intellectual inquiry, themselves depend upon local human forms of thought. 
 
While these may not be the only motivations behind scientific naturalism, 
they are prominent in the literature. I want to conclude this chapter by 
suggesting that naturalism and the sciences are not so closely linked as 
scientific-naturalism has it. That is to say, we can have a form of naturalism 
that is not scientific naturalism. 
   
Putnam has claimed that scientific-naturalism is driven by a “fear of 
normativity”.62 Certainly, normativity and the attempts of scientific-
naturalism to domesticate it played a central role in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
However, as well as being troubled by apparently phenomena like morals, 
meaning and the mental, scientific-naturalism is also concerned to exorcise 
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properties that apparently have nothing to do with normativity from the 
natural world. Colour properties, modal properties and sensations such as 
pain have all come up in the foregoing considerations. 
 
This leads me to believe that the fear of normativity described by Putnam 
can be subsumed by a more general fear—the fear that there is no 
alternative to Scientific-Naturalism but occult mysticism. If norms exist, the 
line of thought goes, they must be very queer things, and the same can be 
said of modal facts. Similarly, if we are to be realists about colours then we 
must accept a view in which the peculiarities of the human visual system are 
mysteriously built into the fabric of a mind independent reality.63 
 
In the final chapter of his The Last Word, Nagel dubs this fear—the fear that 
anything but scientific naturalism must be something very odd—the “fear of 
religion”. 64 The last thing I want to do is open the door of the natural world 
to religion. That would be perverse—if any religion were true, the corollary 
would be that naturalism (scientific or otherwise) was false. However, 
Nagel’s characterization of the fear—the fear that if it’s not scientific-
naturalism, it must be something like religion—is apt, because the fear is 
misplaced. 
 
In the final chapter, I attempt to neutralise this fear by saying something 
about how a naturalism with a looser relationship to the sciences than 
scientific-naturalism should still be considered to be a form of naturalism.
                                                          
63 See (Mackie, 1977, p. 38) for the classic formulation of the argument from queerness in an 
ethical context. 
64 (Nagel, The Last Word, 2003) 
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Chapter 5 – An Alternative Naturalism 
Scientific-naturalism, I argued in chapter one, is the driving force behind the 
clash of the scientific image of the world and the common sense, manifest 
world view. In the following two chapters, I argued that attempts to dissolve 
the clash cannot succeed. Reductive strategies cannot account for the 
normative facts that are part of the common-sense picture, while more 
eliminativist strategies cannot do justice to the realism that we should like 
to adopt towards it. I concluded the previous chapter by suggesting we 
reconcile the clash of images by rejecting scientific-naturalism. 
 
It is evident that rejecting scientific naturalism opens the door to a 
reconciliation of the common-sense picture and the manifest picture in a 
way that other strategies cannot. Insofar as scientific-naturalism precludes 
the existence of any non-scientific facts, its rejection allows for a sort of 
metaphysical pluralism according to which both scientific and non-scientific 
facts can exist. This would allow us to accept the irreducibility of the 
common-sense picture to the sciences without forcing us to deny that the 
common-sense picture was factual. 
 
Such metaphysical pluralism, however, suggests a difficulty that a picture 
that rejected scientific naturalism might face. Scientific-naturalism purports 
to earn its naturalistic credentials by using the natural sciences as a 
standard. This is not available to somebody who rejects the idea that it is the 
sciences alone that delineate the nature of reality. It might, therefore, be 
asked whether such a picture can genuinely be considered to be a natural 
one. The more liberal naturalism that I have suggested is required to 
reconcile the scientific picture with the common sense framework seeks to 
occupy a position between scientific-naturalism on the one hand and 
supernaturalism on the other. This objection states that no such position is 
possible.65 
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The first thing to say about this argument is that it appears to beg the 
question. The suggestion that there is no space for a position between 
scientific-naturalism and supernaturalism can only be drawn from a pre-
existing commitment to the idea that anything that cannot be reduced to the 
natural sciences is thereby supernatural. This cannot be a legitimate move 
when what is at stake is what can properly be considered to be a naturalistic 
conception of the world. 
 
However, somebody who was too open minded to deny that there exists any 
conceptual space between scientific naturalism and the supernatural 
whatsoever might find legitimate puzzlement here. She might acknowledge 
that there is a vast difference between non-reductive mental properties or 
norms, on the one hand, and witches and wizards on the other. However, 
she might wonder on what basis the no man’s land between a world that 
contains only physical particles, and a world that contains gods, ghouls and 
magic, might be claimed for the naturalist.  
 
Consider Stroud’s view, for example. He argues that a more expansive 
naturalism should impose no restrictions on itself in advance on the 
grounds that we “must accept as true everything we find we have to accept 
in order to make sense of everything that we think is part of the world.”. 
Clearly, this account does nothing for somebody who worries about the 
possibility of a naturalistic position between scientific-naturalism and 
supernaturalism. Indeed, it seems to make the idea of naturalism vacuous. 
Stroud himself appears to acknowledge this when he suggests that his view 
might as well be described as “open-mindedness”, with the term 
“naturalism” reserved as a “slogan” for those who believe that no 
supernatural agents are at work in the world.66 
 
However, I think we can be more specific about the requirements on a more 
liberal naturalism. Stroud’s view appears to collapse the distinction between 
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the concept of a natural world and the concept of reality, natural or not. 
Indeed, it is not clear why somebody who subscribed to Stroud’s view 
should deny that supernatural agents might turn out to be at work. In order 
for a view to be considered a form of naturalism at all, it seems, it must 
impose some restrictions on the sorts of things it is willing to countenance.    
 
 In these final sections, I outline what some of these restrictions should be, 
and defend a naturalism shorn of its privileging of the sciences from the 
charge that it cannot be considered naturalistic. 
Naturalism and the Supernatural 
Perhaps the best place to begin in showing why a naturalism that has a more 
distant relationship with the natural sciences can still be considered 
naturalistic is with the areas in which scientific-naturalism and the more 
liberal naturalism agree. 
 
One such area is in the rejection of the supernatural. This includes any kind 
of supernatural entity such as gods, ghosts, witches and the like, and also the 
sort of supernatural epistemic faculties that go hand in hand with these 
entities, such as divine revelation, clairvoyance and precognition. Neither 
the scientific naturalist, nor the more liberal one wants to end up in a 
position such as the one Fodor describes, whereby a subject is conceived as 
a “faculty dualist who is, willy-nilly, landed with occult powers.”67  
 
Now, at this point, it might be objected that an appeal to the supernatural is 
circular. Our notions of what is natural and what is supernatural are 
mutually dependent upon one another, and thus an appeal to the 
supernatural must presuppose a theoretical notion of the natural. As such, 
some independent means of demarcating the natural from the supernatural, 
such as the natural sciences, is required. 
                                                          
67 (Fodor, 1998, p. 7) For Fodor, of course, the only way of dispelling the aura of the occult he 
associates with forms of human understanding such as understanding the meaning of a word is 
by subsuming them under the sciences. 
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I think it is easy to make too much of this argument. After all, it is possible to 
appeal directly to entities such as gods, ghouls and magic as the sorts of 
things that a more liberal naturalist would reject without, apparently, 
making an appeal to a concept that was itself supposed to be explained by an 
explication of liberal naturalism.  
 
Nonetheless, I think we can highlight something that can play a role similar 
to the role the natural sciences play in scientific-naturalism. Presumably, the 
role is supposed to be something like this. The natural sciences are means of 
finding out about the natural world, therefore anything they discover is ipso 
facto natural, and we must discount anything that is not discoverable by 
them as non-natural. I think a similar argument is available to the more 
liberal naturalist. 
 
This argument can be brought out by the way in which certain realist 
accounts of norms reject Platonism. According to Platonist accounts of 
norms, say the norms that are involved in mathematics, ethics or meaning, 
the norms were always ‘out there’ for us to discover, and mind-independent 
constituents of reality. They might have never been happened upon by 
humans.  
 
Some realists about norms, McDowell for example, reject that norms can 
mysteriously float freely of human practice. Instead, roughly speaking, 
norms are instituted by human beings. This does not, however, imply that 
the facts about norms can simply be reduced to beliefs in a way that would 
make it true to say, whatever people believe is right is true. According to this 
sort of minimal realist, there is a form of ratification-independence that does 
not rely upon a Platonistic construal of norms.68  
 
                                                          
68 McDowell makes this point in respect of meanings in section 12 of (McDowell, 1984) when he 
argues that a recoil from the Platonist picture should not be seen as a recoil from the idea of a 
ratification independent conception of whether the meaning of a word is correct or incorrect. 
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Now, the sort of move that these minimal realists make seems to me to be a 
move of a naturalistic bent. What it is that makes the Platonistic construal of 
norms that constitute the facts of mathematics, ethics and logic queer is that 
they are wholly autonomous from any human practices. Instead, according 
to this sort of realist, we must have an account of norms that is in some 
sense related to the things that human beings do. 
 
I think that we can generalise this sort of move. Let us grant that science 
yields natural facts and entities. Let us further grant that any entities or facts 
that are instituted by human practices or capacities constitute natural 
entities and facts. The argument for this would be that human beings are 
natural creatures (what else could they be), in virtue of this, any facts that 
are instituted by human beings are thereby natural facts. 
 
Now, clearly, the notion of instituting a fact is a difficult one requiring fuller 
elaboration. However, the picture is not completely unfamiliar to 
contemporary philosophy. It is the picture McDowell has about moral facts, 
the picture that Wittgenstein has about mathematical, mental and linguistic 
facts, and the picture that Brandom has about facts in general.69  
 
Supposing we could come with these philosophers to see the facts 
associated with the common-sense picture as instituted by human practices, 
on my method of drawing a line between the natural and the supernatural, 
they would come out as perfectly natural facts. Similarly, gods, ghouls and 
magic do not seem to be the sorts of things that could be instituted by 
human practices, and thus they come out as supernatural. 
 
My method also does justice to the insight of Sellars that it is only when we 
consider the place of human beings in nature that that things begin to get 
difficult. By adopting a form of naturalism that emphasises the naturalness 
of human beings, and indeed, partly delineates the natural world on the 
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basis of their activities, we can avoid many of the placement problems 
traditionally associated with naturalism.    
 
Fodor’s worries that such an account might lead to a conception of persons 
as endowed with occult epistemic faculties might also be addressed. For a 
Platonist, it is clearly difficult to explain how an edifice of facts that is wholly 
autonomous of anything to do with human beings might be accessible to 
human minds.70 One response has been to posit special faculties that are 
designed to latch on to such facts. Fodor is right to be suspicious.  
 
For Fodor, however, the origins and functioning of the faculties he imagines 
can only be “occult”; he is a scientific-naturalist. However, there a liberal 
naturalism that takes natural facts to include those instituted by human 
practices has a response to this. It can say that the ability to know about 
certain facts, those instituted by human practices or made possible by 
human capacities, comes when people are initiated into the instituting 
practices. Such initiation might include into language, or into moral 
practices, as all children typically are. 
 
By describing how human beings are actually initiated into practices, we 
make it intelligible how they can come to know facts instituted by those 
practice. Further, by showing that nothing mysterious or spooky happens 
when somebody is inducted into a practice, we can claim a certain form of 
naturalistic advantage over other views. For example, it might be supposed 
that a child becomes sensitive to norms not by engaging its mind with the 
platonic heavens, but through commonplace teaching and instruction, giving 
explanations, correcting mistakes, rewarding good behaviour and punishing 
                                                          
70 Indeed, it is a problem for somebody who subscribes to a certain understanding of the 
absolute conception of reality that was discussed in the previous chapter. It is the difficulty that 
that led Kant to suggest that we can never know about the world as it is in itself (that is, 
detached from our ways of understanding it). 
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bad. Nothing here is unusual, it is simply part of an ordinary human 
upbringing.71  
Philosophy and the sciences 
A second point that might be made to diffuse worries that a more liberal 
naturalism is unscientific is that it must still be required to accept the best 
science available as truth. A naturalistic philosophy should not take itself to 
be in a position to refute the sciences, from the arm chair, as it were, and a 
more liberal naturalism is included in this. 
 
That is not to say that philosophy should steer completely clear of the 
sciences. This thesis has, after all, had at its core the relationship between 
philosophy and the sciences. Similarly, philosopher have made grand claims 
about the domains of cognitive science and its relevance to traditional 
philosophical problems.72  
 
However, philosophy should not get involved in first order scientific claims. 
Take the dispute over whether or not scientific naturalism is truth with 
which I have been engaged. It should be obvious that scientific-naturalism is 
not itself a scientific theory. Rather, it is a piece of metaphysics. Rather than 
engaging with any particular scientific discovery, it is a claim to the effect 
that whatever science does discover, that is all there is to the world. 
Similarly, the dispute between McDowell and Burge about the role of 
cognitive science is not a dispute about any first order theory. Rather, it is a 
dispute about what cognitive scientists are actually investigating and its 
relationship to conscious experience. Is it conscious experience itself, as 
Burge might be inclined to say, or is it the mechanism that underpins 
conscious experience as McDowell would be more likely to say? 
 
                                                          
71 Many take this to be a point Wittgenstein makes in the rule-following passages. Kripke has 
also taken a similar line to rebut what he considers to be a mistaken, and seemingly unnatural, 
conception of possible worlds. (Kripke, 1980, pp. 43-44) 
72 This exchange begins with (Burge, 2005) 
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Thus, insofar as a more liberal naturalism does not touch on the first order 
claims of the sciences, it is not unscientific. The rejection of scientific 
naturalism should be regarded not as anti-science, but rather as anti-
scientism. 
 
There is another sense in which this sort of naturalism cannot be said to be 
unscientific. A liberal naturalism does not attempt to bring back the notion 
of “first philosophy”. According to such a notion, most commonly associated 
with Descartes, science itself stands in need of justification as a means of 
yielding knowledge, which is the task of philosophy. Its rejection might even 
be considered to be positively naturalistic. Quine, for example, at one point 
glosses naturalism as nothing more than “abandonment of the of a first 
philosophy prior to natural science”.73 
 
According to a more liberal naturalism, then philosophy is not anti-scientific 
by contradicting or subordinating the natural sciences. It should not, 
however, countenance scientism by allowing the sciences a monopoly over 
all things as the image of philosophy being continuous with the sciences 
suggests. According to a more liberal naturalism, philosophy and the 
sciences are on an equal footing. It might be thought that this opens up the 
sort of pluralism envisioned by Ryle: 
 
“In the way in which a landscape painter paints a good or bad picture 
of a range of hills, the geologist does not paint a rival picture, good or 
bad, of those hills, though what he tells us the geology of are the same 
hills that the painter depicts or misdepicts. The painter is not doing 
bad geology and the geologist is not doing good or bad landscape 
painting. In the way in which the joiner tells us what a piece of 
furniture is like and gets his description right or wrong (no matter 
whether he is talking about its colour, the wood it is made of, its style, 
carpentry or period), the nuclear physicist does not proffer a 
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competing description, right or wrong, though what he tells us the 
nuclear physics of covers what the joiner describes. They are not 
giving conflicting answers to the same question or to the same sort of 
question, though the physicist’s questions are, in a rather artificial 
sense of ‘about’, about what the joiner gives his information about. 
The physicist does not mention the furniture; what he does mention 
are, so to speak, bills for such goods as, inter alia, bits of furniture.”74 
 
As Ryle suggests, the non-scientific explanations allowed by a more liberal 
naturalism should not be conceived as being in conflict with the 
explanations the sciences provide. While these explanations should retain a 
degree of autonomy from the sciences, they are still constrained by the need 
to cohere with what science has told us. This reflects an acceptance of 
Sellars’ view that philosophy should allow us to understand “how things in 
the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest 
possible sense of the term.”75  
Explanatory Gaps 
Another area in which scientific-naturalism and a more liberal naturalism 
agree is on an ambition to leave nothing unexplained. Both aspire to 
eliminate explanatory gaps, though liberal naturalism has a more tolerant 
attitude to the sorts of explanations that are admissible, and the sorts of 
facts that can be assumed as basic. 
 
This means that the liberal naturalist must be on her guard against boot-
strapping. For example, the claim that meaning and mind are not reducible 
to concepts that we take to provide an exhaustive explanation of other 
animals, neurophysiology or biology, for example, can give the impression of 
a gap that must be bridged. A liberal naturalism might try to counter this by 
telling an explanatory story about how children come to learning language 
in the first instance. It might begin by noting that language learning begins 
                                                          
74 (Ryle, 2015, p. 68) 
75 (Sellars W. , 2007, p. 369) 
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with capacities about which there is nothing special—drill and repetition, 
for example. Then at some stage the child begins to form sentences, and 
eventually it exhibits a partial understanding of the words it uses, before, at 
last, reaching a stage at which it is a competent speaker. For example, the 
child may reach a stage where it can say, “I am in pain”, but does not 
understand that the concept of pain can also be applied to others.76 Once 
this stage has been reached, it is not such a leap to see how the child might 
be brought to say of others at appropriate moments “They are in pain”, and 
thereby acquire the concept of pain. 
 
Through such stories of gradually increasing complexity, beginning with 
primitive capacities that are no more occult than ‘talking’ parrots, a liberal 
naturalist might try to dispel the mystery surrounding capacities that are 
not subsumable under the sciences. Part of this might involve showing how 
those special irreducible capacities and abilities, unique to human beings, 
are in some sense dependent upon those that are not so special, as in the 
example above.77 
 
Now, one might reject the story of language acquisition above as one that 
eliminates explanatory gaps. It might be argued that there is a sudden 
discontinuity between the child as a non-linguistic creature and a concept 
using one that the explanation does not account for. The point in this 
context, however, is that a liberal naturalism is committed to eliminating 
such explanatory gaps, which is part of what entitles it to claim to be a 
naturalistic position. 
 
One might imagine, for example, a position according to which a creature 
becoming capable of using concepts was a gift from God. When probed 
about quite how such an ability came to be gifted, the response might come 
“God moves in mysterious ways.” According to such a view, the actions of 
                                                          
76 Arguably, this shows that the child does not have the concept of pain at all, for our concept of 
pain is one that can essentially be applied to ourselves in the first person and to others in the 
third person. 
77 This is a point made by McDowell. (McDowell, 1998b, p. 190) 
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God are taken to be basic explanations, despite the fact that they are 
acknowledged not to be terribly explanatory. My suggestion is that it is not 
only the commitment to an ontology that includes Gods that renders this 
sort of view to be a form of non-naturalism (though that would certainly be 
sufficient), but also its willingness to countenance explanatory gaps in its 
understanding of the way the world works.  
  
Now, one might think that liberal naturalism is in a better position than 
scientific-naturalism to eliminate explanatory gaps. Recall the discussion of 
explanatory gaps in Chapter 2. In order to eliminate them, the workings of a 
phenomena—for example, language acquisition and use—have to be fully 
explained. However, in limiting itself to the conceptual resources available 
to the natural sciences, scientific-naturalism jeopardises its ability to 
provide a fully explanatory account of many parts of the common-sense 
picture. While a more liberal naturalism is by no means guaranteed to be 
able to explain all of the features of the extremely difficult phenomena 
thrown up by the common-sense picture, it has more tools at its disposal to 
do so.   
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that a naturalism that has been shorn of the 
sciences—one that holds scientific-naturalism to be false—can still 
legitimately be considered to be naturalistic.  
 
Much like scientific-naturalism, a more liberal naturalism must still deny the 
supernatural, but might suffer from circularity of vacuity if it attempts to 
define itself as an opposition to the supernatural. I therefore outlined an 
account of what facts can be properly considered to be naturalistic that 
might be considered anthropocentric. According to it, in addition to the 
world of the natural sciences, it is legitimate to consider as natural facts that 
are instituted by human capacities or practices.   
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A second way in which a less minimalistic world picture can still be 
naturalistic is by refusing to admit anything that contradicts the best science 
available. In this respect, liberal naturalism is not unscientific—scientific-
naturalism is not, after all, a scientific theory. According to a more liberal 
naturalism, neither philosophy nor science is subservient to the other. In 
particular, liberal naturalism eschews the idea of first philosophy—the idea 
that the sciences must be underpinned by philosophy. 
 
Finally, like scientific-naturalism, a more liberal naturalism can retain a 
commitment to eradicating explanatory gaps. While naturalistic 
explanations certainly include those that the sciences have to offer, a more 
liberal naturalism can add to that category explanations that exhibit the 
features I have described above. Provided our explanations flout no known 
propositions of science; provided they are embedded in concrete human 
practices and capacities; and provided they contain no sudden 
discontinuities or explanatory gaps, then we should not be troubled by the 
thought that they are occult or mystical. 
 
 ‘Can science explain everything?’ is a question that troubles philosophers 
and non-philosophers alike. I have argued that it cannot. However, this is 
not to be taken as hostility to science, and certainly not as an endorsement 
of supernaturalism. The target of this thesis has been scientific-naturalism—
the metaphysical claim that the sciences are the only game in town—and at a 
more general level, scientism itself. 
 
If the corollary of rejecting scientific-naturalism is the acceptance of a 
mystical and spooky supernaturalism, then Scientific-Naturalism is surely 
justified as a matter of intellectual respectability, despite the consequences 
for our ordinary conception of meaning and the mental. However, I have 
argued that there is conceptual space between a worldview exhausted by 
the sciences, and a worldview infected by the occult. Occupying this space 
allows us to retain our intuitive conception of meaning, understanding and 
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the mental, and much else besides. Not only this—it also earns us the right 
to call ourselves naturalists.  
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